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ABSTRACT

THE POLICY EVALUATION OF MEASURES TO REDUCE POLICE USE OF
FORCE
Li Sian Goh, L.L.M.
Aaron Chalfin, Ph.D.
Despite the widespread implementation of new policies intended at reducing police
officers’ use of force in encounters with civilians, evidence about these policies remains
patchy. Consisting of a series of three papers, my dissertation seeks to contribute to the
body of knowledge on measures to reduce police use of force. The first paper considers
the effect of consent decrees and other forms of federal intervention on fatalities resulting
from citizen encounters with the police. Using a panel dataset of deaths caused by the
police between the years 2000 and 2016, a difference-in-differences analysis found that
court-appointed monitorships reduced fatalities by 29.1%. The second paper examines
the effect of departmental oversight over body-worn cameras on officer-involved
shootings. Using a panel dataset of police departments in 36 large departments across the
United States, a difference-in-differences analysis finds that while the presence of bodyworn cameras alone did not reduce shootings, restricting officer discretion on when
cameras should be activated reduced shootings by 33.3%. The final paper evaluates the
effect of a de-escalation training program. A difference-in-differences analysis of
individual officers revealed no significant changes in serious force levels between
officers who had been trained and officers who had not been trained. However, an
analysis comparing the department which implemented the training with other law
enforcement agencies in the same state suggested that serious force rates declined by
approximately 40%. In totality, the dissertation provides evidence about the effectiveness
of contemporary measures to reduce use of force.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……..………………….………………………………………….……………...... v
LIST OF TABLES ………………….………………………………………………………………………....... vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.…………………………………………………………………………....... viii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION ………………………………………............................................ 1
Paper 1 Summary………….………………………………............................................................... 3
Paper 2 Summary …………………………………………………………………………......................... 4
Paper 3 Summary ………………………………………………………………………………....................... 4
PAPER 1. GOING LOCAL: DO CONSENT DECREES AND OTHER FORMS OF
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS
REDUCE POLICE KILLINGS?.................................................................................... 6
Abstract……………………………………………………..…………………………... 6
Introduction…….…………………………………………..…………………………... 6
Literature Review………………………………………..……………………………... 8
Data………………………………………………………..…………………………… 16
Method…..…………………………………………………..…………………………. 21
Results……………………………………………………...……………………………23
Robustness Checks……………………………………………………...……………... 28
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………..……………… 31
Paper 1 Tables and Figures……………………………………………………............ 35
PAPER 2. DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OVERSIGHT OF BODY-WORN
CAMERA TECHNOLOGY: WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE OFFICERINVOLVED SHOOTINGS…………………………………………………………… 49
Abstract……………………………………………………………………….………... 49
Introduction…………………………………………………………………...……….. 49
Literature Review…………………………………………………………..…………. 50
Data…………………………………………………………………………..………… 54
Method……………………………………………………………………..………...… 62
Results………………………………………………………………………...……....... 63
Robustness Checks……………………………………………………….…….…….... 65
Discussion………………………………………………………………………..…….. 68
Paper 2 Tables and Figures …………………………………………………...……… 71
PAPER 3. WARRIOR VS. GUARDIAN POLICING CULTURE: THE EFFECT OF
DE-ESCALATION
TRAINING
ON
POLICE
USE
OF
FORCE……………………………………………………………………….......…….. 79
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………...……. 79
Introduction……………………………………………………………………...…….. 79
Literature Review…………………………………………………….………..………. 81
Background…………………………………………………………………………….. 86
Empirical Strategy ………………………………………………………….................. 89
Data…………………………………………………………………………………….. 94
Results………………………………………………………………………………….. 97

v

Robustness Checks………………………………………………….………………... 103
Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………………………… 109
Paper 3 Tables and Figures …………………………………………………............. 112
GENERAL DISCUSSION…………………………………………………................ 137
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………. 140

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Summary Statistics…………………………………..………………………. 35
Table 1.2 Main Results ……...…………………………………………………………. 36
Table 1.3 Negative Binomial Regression………………………………………………. 37
Table 1.4 Results for reduced panel dataset (77 agencies) …………………………….. 38
Table 1.5 Results for further reduced panel dataset (36 agencies) …………………….. 39
Table 1.6 SHR felonious killings as dependent variable……………………………….. 40
Table 1.7 Event study………………………………………………………..…………. 41
Table 1.8 Regression results for monitor variable where agencies dropped
individually……………………………………………………………………………... 42
Table 1.9: Regression results for technical assistance variable where agencies dropped
individually…………………………………………………………............................... 43
Table 1.10: Regression results for investigation variable where agencies dropped
individually……………………………………………………………………………... 44
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics…………………………………………………………... 70
Table 2.2 Main Results…………....……………………………………………………. 71
Table 2.3 Robustness Checks…………………………………………………………... 72
Table 2.4 Body-worn camera roll-out dates, 2010 – 2016……………………………... 74
Table 3.1 Summary statistics of Camden officer-month panel dataset……………….. 108
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of New Jersey department-quarter panel
dataset …………………..........……………………………………………………….. 109
Table 3.3 Difference-in-differences…………………………………………………… 110
Table 3.4 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden……………………………... 111
Table 3.5 Difference-in-differences using weighted measure………………................ 112
Table 3.6 Difference-in-differences of NJ department-quarter panel dataset................. 113
Table 3.7 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is violent crime
rate)…………………………………………………………………............................. 114
Table 3.8 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (treatment occurs one quarter
earlier)………………………………………………………………............................. 115
Table 3.9 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is all use of force
incidents)………………………………………………………………………………. 116
Table 3.10 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is more serious use of
force incidents)……………………………………………............................................ 117
Table 3.11 Dates of training………………………........................................................ 118

vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1.1 Fatal Encounters vs. SHR counts of police killings………………………..… 46
Figure 1.2 Police killings before and after intervention…………………………….....… 47
Figure 1.3 Event study…………………………………………………………………... 48
Figure 2.1 Incidence rate ratios for officer discretion variable when individual departments
dropped from dataset……………………………………………………………………. 75
Figure 3.1 De-escalation training rollout in Camden County, New Jersey……………... 119
Figure 3.2 Use of force before and after training……………………………………...... 120
Figure 3.3 Event study for PERF-ICAT training…………………………………….… 121
Figure 3.4 Use of force incidents per 1,000 arrests………………………………….... 122
Figure 3.5 Trends in serious use of force: Camden vs. five largest New Jersey
cities………………………………………………………………………………….... 123
Figure 3.6 Trends in Camden use of force: breakdown by force level………………... 124
Figure 3.7 Trends in serious UOF incidents: Camden vs. synthetic Camden................ 125
Figure 3.8 Serious UOF rate gap between Camden and synthetic Camden…………... 126
Figure 3.9 Trends in violent crime rate: Camden vs. synthetic Camden…………….... 127
Figure 3.10 Subsuming anticipation effects: treatment occurs one quarter
earlier………………………………………………………………………………….. 128
Figure 3.11 Using all force incidents as outcomes……………………………………. 129
Figure 3.12 Using incidents involving firearm and non-firearm weapons…………..... 130
Figure 3.13 Gap in rate of serious force in Camden and placebo gaps in all 34 control
municipalities………………………………………………………………………….. 131
Figure 3.14 Gap in rate of serious force in Camden and placebo gaps in all 29 control
municipalities excluding tests with a pre-intervention RMSPE of over
20………………………………………………………………………………………. 132

viii

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Fatalities resulting from police use of force in the United States far outstrips those in
other developed nations (Zimring, 2017). A study reported that 57,375 years of life were
lost to police violence in 2015 (Bui, Coates, & Matthay 2018), suggesting that police
violence is a public health issue in addition to a political one.
Much is known about the individual (Brandl et al., 2001; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002;
Alpert et al., 2004; Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Ridgeway, 2016; Fryer, 2019), situational
(Geller & Karales, 1981; Brown, 1984; Alpert & Dunham, 1999; MacDonald et al., 2003;
Alpert et al., 2004; Hine et al., 2018), organizational (Fyfe, 1979; Binder et al., 1982;
Sherman, 1983; Fyfe, 1988; Alpert & MacDonald, 2001; Shjarback & White, 2016), and
structural (Fyfe, 1980; Jacobs, 1998; MacDonald et al., 2001) correlates of police use of
force. This body of literature is important insofar as it provides an overview about the
factors which determine police violence. In recent years, however, the post-Ferguson era
in which calls for police reform have gained increasing resonance has also stimulated a
thirst for policy solutions that reduce if not eliminate the number of fatalities resulting from
police-citizen encounters. Solutions such as body-worn cameras (Ariel, Farrar, &
Sutherland, 2015; Ariel et al, 2016a; Ariel et al., 2016b; Lum et al., 2019), less-lethal
weapons (MacDonald et al., 2009; Alpert et al., 2011), training in de-escalation, procedural
justice, or conflict resolution techniques (Meyer et al., 2009; Owens et al., 2018; Engel et
al., 2020), early intervention systems (Shjarback 2015), and peer intervention programs
(Aronie and Lopez, 2017) have been deployed in an effort to reduce what Lawrence
Sherman (2018) has termed ‘system crashes’.
In this endeavor, criminologists have been hobbled by the lack of reliable nation-wide
data on fatalities caused by the police, with official data sources such as the FBI’s
Supplementary Homicide Report and the CDC’s National Vital Statistics System coming
under criticism for under-counting the number of fatalities that result from civilian
encounters with the police (Fischer-Baum, 2014; Banks et al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2017;
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Loftin et al., 2017; Zimring, 2017). However, two approaches have made it possible to
study police violence nevertheless. First, researchers have used crowd-sourced data
collection efforts such as those spearheaded by media organizations (The Guardian, 2016;
The Washington Post, 2018) or independent collectives such as Fatal Encounters (Burghart,
2019). The first paper uses the latter source given both its comprehensiveness (Feldman et
al., 2017, Ozkman et al., 2018) and its making available more years of data than those
efforts created in the wake of the events in Ferguson, Missouri. Second, researchers have
used departmental administrative data to study use of force (Fyfe, 1988; MacDonald et al,
2003; Shjarback & White, 2016; Fryer, 2019). While this approach can limit the scope of
findings to that of the jurisdiction studied, the granularity of departmental administrative
data often allows lower-level uses of force that do not result in fatalities to be studied.
Given that rigorous policy evaluation is key to implementing policy solutions that are
effective in reducing police violence, this dissertation seeks to provide evidence about three
very different proposed policies. The first is the federal intervention introduced by Section
14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which provided
the Department of the Justice with the ability to investigate and settle with law enforcement
agencies engaged in a pattern or practice of police misconduct. Commonly, such
intervention takes the form of consent decrees, or legal settlements addressing a range of
policies relating to departmental recruitment, hiring, training, data collection, and more.
The second relates to body-worn cameras. While the efficacy of body-worn cameras have
been repeatedly tested through randomized controlled trials (Jennings, Lynch, & Fridell;
2015; Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Ready & Young, 2015; Ariel et al., 2016a; Ariel
et al., 2016b; Ariel et al., 2017; Hedberg, Katz, & Choate, 2017; Braga et al., 2018), the
paper seeks to clarify the extent to which political arrangements can affect the ability of a
technological solution to achieve desired outcomes, i.e. the extent to which departmental
oversight can determine body-worn cameras’ efficacy in reducing use of force. The third
paper evaluates a de-escalation training program in Camden County, New Jersey.
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Taken together, these papers utilize different measures and levels of police use of
force. In the first, the measure is the number of civilians who die following encounters with
law enforcement officers. In the second, officer-involved shootings, both fatal and nonfatal, are utilized. The third paper addresses lower-level uses of force that nevertheless
have the potential to result in substantial human injury. By considering these different
measures and different policies, these papers together provide evidence about the promises
and pitfalls of innovative policy solutions that seeks to resolve one of the critical political
and public health issues of our time.
Paper 1 Summary
The first paper in this dissertation seeks to evaluate the impact of federal intervention
on municipal police departments, as implemented by Section 14141 of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, on the number of people killed by law
enforcement officers. Despite widespread calls for police reform to address lethal use of
force, there has been little empirical evaluation of this powerful legal instrument to date.
The paper uses data from Fatal Encounters, a crowd-sourced dataset, on the number
of people killed by police between the years 2000 and 2016. These data were combined
with information on various levels of federal intervention, namely DOJ investigation, the
issuance of a technical assistance letter, consent decree settlements, and the presence of
court-appointed monitors, to create a department-by-year panel dataset of 962 municipal
police departments with jurisdiction over populations of at least 30,000. Using the violent
crime rate as a control variable, as well as agency and year fixed effects, a Poisson
regression suggested that DOJ investigations and monitorships reduced fatalities caused
by the police by some 30%, while the issuance of technical assistance letters were likely to
have a counterproductive effect in increasing the number of people killed. The results
suggest that federal intervention has some effect on the number of police killings, but in
the absence of court-appointed monitors to oversee consent decree settlements, the
negotiated settlements alone will not reduce fatalities.
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Paper 2 Summary
The second dissertation paper approaches the topic of police accountability by
examining the relationship between departmental oversight over body-worn camera usage
and fatal and non-fatal officer-involved shootings. While randomized controlled trials have
sought to identify the impact of body-worn camera usage on a number of measures
including use of force, arrests, and officer injury, to date no studies have examined
departmental variation in body-worn camera policies and their impact on officer-involved
shootings, a key measure of force.
This paper uses administrative data on officer-involved shootings from 36 of the 50
largest police departments in the United States, as well as their published body-worn
camera policies. Three aspects of these policies – whether they were made accessible to
members of the public, whether they restricted officer discretion on when body-worn
cameras should be activated, and whether they included guidelines prohibiting footage
tampering and misuse – were examined for their impact on officer-involved shootings.
Using a difference-in-differences analysis on a department-by-month panel dataset
encompassing these 36 departments for the months between January 2010 and December
2016, it was found that only restricting officer discretion with respect to camera activation
had a significant effect on officer-involved shootings. However, the effect was sizeable –
restricting officer discretion reduced officer-involved shootings by over 30%. The analysis
also examined the effect of these policies on crime, arrests for index crimes, and arrests for
low-level ‘quality of life’ offenses. Body-worn camera policy did not significantly affect
crime or index crime arrests, but did reduce low-level arrests. Based on the reduction, there
was some evidence that body-worn cameras reduced officer-involved shootings by
reducing police contact with civilians.
Paper 3 Summary
This paper seeks to evaluate the Police Executive Research Forum’s Integrating
Communications, Assessment, and Tactics training program, a curriculum emphasizing
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de-escalation skills, on use of force in Camden County, New Jersey. Despite the
widespread interest that de-escalation training has attracted over the past few years, little
is known about its effectiveness in reducing use of force. Capitalizing on the fact that the
training was rolled out in phases, with officers being trained on different dates, the paper
first analyzed the impact of de-escalation training on individual officers, conducting a
difference-in-differences analysis on an officer-by-month panel dataset.
Serious use of force, defined as any incident in which officer force more serious than
a compliance hold or a takedown (use of hands/fists, legs, pepper spray, baton, canine,
conducted energy devices or firearms) was deployed. No significant changes to serious
force were found post-training. However, given that the analysis of individual officers may
not have accounted for spillover effects in which officers who had not yet been trained
were nevertheless subject to the peer influence of trained officers and accordingly reduced
their use of force, a second department-wide analysis was undertaken. Using a synthetic
control methodology, the analysis compared serious force levels in Camden County with
a weighted average of other large law enforcement agencies in New Jersey. The results
suggested a 40% reduction in serious force events following the implementation of deescalation training. The study offers evidence that if properly implemented, de-escalation
training may reap large benefits in reducing human injury.
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PAPER 1. GOING LOCAL: DO CONSENT DECREES AND OTHER
FORMS OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN MUNICIPAL POLICE
DEPARTMENTS REDUCE POLICE KILLINGS?1
Abstract
Despite calls for police reform to address lethal use of force, there has been little
empirical evaluation of consent decrees —settlement agreements that address police
departments’ use of force policies and practice. This study considers the effect of
Department of Justice intervention on law enforcement agencies’ levels of use of force.
Data on the number of people killed by police between the years 2000 and 2016 were
drawn from Fatal Encounters, a crowd-sourced dataset. These data were combined with
information on the date of consent decree implementation to create a department-by-year
panel dataset. The findings suggested that while there is little evidence that consent decrees
targeting use of force decrease police killings, there was some evidence that other forms of
intervention did affect levels of lethal use of force.
Introduction
Since 2014, there has been an increase in the amount of public attention in law
enforcement-related deaths. Following the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,
Eric Garner in New York City, Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland, and other Black men
and women in cities across the U.S., advocates have sought police reform to reduce lethal
use of force.
In the wake of such calls, the consent decree has come under renewed focus as one of
several possible avenues of reform. Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) of 1994 provides the Department of Justice (DOJ) with the
power to instigate federal intervention in police departments where there was evidence of
a ‘pattern or practice of misconduct’, such as gender discrimination, racially biased

1

A version of this paper will be published as Goh, L. (2020). Going Local: Do Consent Decrees and Other
Forms of Federal Intervention in Municipal Police Departments Reduce Police Killings? Justice Quarterly.
Once published, it will be available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2020.1733637 .
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policing, excessive use of force, or other civil rights violations. Where such evidence is
found, the department typically comes under a consent decree. Despite the existence of a
wide-ranging literature on police use of force, relatively little attention has been paid to
consent decrees and there have been no attempts to evaluate its ability to reduce the number
of people killed by the police.
DOJ interventions generally begin with an investigation to establish whether there has
been a pattern or practice of misconduct in the police department as alleged. The findings
that result then determine the DOJ’s next steps. The DOJ may take no further action,
concluding that the incident which led them to open the investigation was the result of an
individual’s actions and not indicative of structural problems within the department. On
the other hand, the DOJ may issue a technical assistance letter in which it details the
policies it advises such departments to adopt. Such letters are not enforceable in court. If,
on the other hand, the DOJ determines that a technical assistance letter is not sufficient to
address the pattern or practice of misconduct found in the police department, it can use a
consent decree to implement the reforms it deems necessary. These consent decrees are
enforced by a court, and may be accompanied by the court appointment of a monitor to
oversee the process. The court-appointed monitor represents a further degree of scrutiny
brought to bear on the department. Departments can be under a consent decree but have no
monitor, while law enforcement agencies generally cannot —with one exception —be
overseen by a monitor without being placed under the consent decree.
Consent decrees, and more generally DOJ interventions, are therefore a disruption of
usual practice in local departments, typically requiring that departments change policies,
procedures, and training methods. They represent federal action upon a local, police
department-level problem that is nevertheless widespread —a ‘pattern or practice’ of
misconduct. While they hold out the hope of reform for local police departments that are
not able to correct their mascon-duct on their own, they are also extremely expensive and
time-consuming. As such, consent decrees which are implemented with the end of reducing
police killings of civilians, should be carefully evaluated on their ability to achieve this
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result. In theory, if consent decrees or other associated forms of federal intervention are
effective in reforming police departments, police departments should see fewer police
killings during and after the time that they come under federal intervention.
This paper is the first to evaluate the effects of civil rights investigations by the DOJ
and the consent decree process on an important —arguably the most important —measure
of use of force: death. Consent decrees are an important tool in the DOJ arsenal for police
reform, but they can be expensive and time-consuming. If they are not effective, that raises
the question of whether other, more effective policies for police reform should be
implemented, or even whether any such exist.
In this study, a department-by-year panel dataset of 962 police agencies over the years
2000-2016 is used to estimate the effect of federal intervention on police killings. The
results showed that while consent decrees in and of themselves did not decrease police
killings, there was some evidence that DOJ investigations and court-appointed monitors
reduced police killings. On the other hand, the issuance of a technical assistance letter was
found to have a counterproductive effect in increasing them.
Literature Review
The academic literature on police use of force can be organized into the following
categories: (1) the prevalence of police killings, (2) individual characteristics driving
police use of force, (3) situational and/or organizational characteristics behind the same,
and (4) sociological ex-planation’s for police use of force. There has been some discussion
of (5) the consent decree measure as a specific response to police use of force. While the
empirical literature on the first four categories is robust and has been the subject of much
criminological attention over the past few decades, it is legal academics rather than
criminologists who have tended to scrutinize various aspects of the consent decree as a
court intervention to reduce police use of deadly force.
Measuring Police Killings

8

There is very little certainty about the exact number of people killed by the police in
the U.S. each year. While there are three official sources which provide counts of people
killed by police, they are not entirely consistent with each other and none of them are
reliable, even as estimates. The first is the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR),
which gives an estimate of around 400 ‘felonious killings’ each year. There are several
reasons to think this does not represent all police killings. In the first place, SHR data
reporting is not mandatory, and accordingly not all police agencies do report. Felonious
killings also refer to justifiable police killings, whereas ‘unjustified police killings’ are not
a classification. If the legality of a police killing is in question, it may not be reported to
the SHR until the investigation is resolved. In the event that the investigation concludes in
a new reporting year, the old SHR data may not be updated (Fischer-Baum, 2014).
The second official source is provided by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System, which sources its data from the cause
of death listed on death certificates. The NVSS includes information on the cause of death,
including ‘homicide by legal intervention’, and estimated counts are similar —though not
identical —to that of the SHR. However, coroners’ reports do not always mention police
involvement, leading to miss-classification. An assessment (Loftin et al., 2017) of the
consistency of estimates and found that the SHR estimate was 17% larger than the NVSS
estimate, with both systems underreporting for different reasons. While the SHR
underestimates counts as some jurisdictions fail to report, the NVSS misclassifies cases
because coroners fail to mention police involvement in homicides.
The third official source of homicide counts come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
which computes the count of ‘arrest-related homicides’. The Arrest-Related Deaths (ARD)
program, which began in 2003, include all deaths that occur through interactions between
law enforcement officers and members of the public, not just those that happen during
arrest. In 2015, an evaluation concluded that it captured no more than 49% of law
enforcement homicides (Banks et al., 2015), leading to the program’s suspension.
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Given the lack of reliable official estimates of police killings in the United States,
there have been several non-governmental initiatives that have sought to estimate the
number of people killed by the police each year. Generally, these efforts —largely led by
media outlets —rely on a combination of crowdsourced information and verified media
reporting. In particular, the Guardian’s The Counted project estimated that 1146 people
were killed in 2015 and 1092 people were killed in 2016. The project was not continued in
succeeding years. The Washington Post created a similar database, tracking every fatal
shooting in the United States by a police officer in the line of duty since the beginning of
2015. Their estimates are broadly similar to that of the Guardian. The data analysis website
FiveThirtyEight.com also compiled a count of police killings for the calendar year 2014,
estimating 1100 officer-caused deaths. These figures were further corroborated by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ redesign of its ARD program (Banks et al., 2016), which used
a hybrid approach that reviews open information sources to identify potential arrest-related
deaths, and then surveys law enforcement agencies and medical examiners’ and coroners’
offices to confirm all arrest-related deaths. In all, these unofficial reports estimate a number
some 2.5 times higher than the SHR and other official counts. A capture-recapture analysis
seeking to quantify underreporting of law enforcement-related deaths in the US (Feldman
et al., 2017) has suggested that, for the year 2015, the NVSS documented 44.9% of police
killings while The Counted documented 93.1% of such deaths.
As most crowd-sourced databases were created in the post-Ferguson era, most nongovernmental initiatives tracking police killings track only a few years’ worth of data. The
crowd-sourced Fatal Encounters dataset, which the study draws on, is an exception in that
it makes an effort to record all police killings that occurred since the beginning of the year
2000. This effort has seen varying degrees of success, doing a better job in later years.
While it recorded around 500 deaths in the year 2000, the number of recorded deaths rose
to around 1000 homicides by the year 2010. This is probably because many local papers
were not regularly posted to the Internet in earlier years, and it was more difficult to find
data on law enforcement-related deaths. In sum, official records of police killings are
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inconsistent and under-reported while non-governmental initiatives to measure prevalence
are also problematic.
Individual Characteristics Driving Police Use of Force
For years, researchers have sought to explain police officers’ use of force through
individual characteristics of both officers and civilians, such as race, gender, age, and years
of officer experience. Amongst these factors, civilian race has attracted the most attention,
with early research focusing on whether African-Americans are shot or killed by the police
disproportionate to their numbers in the general population. Such studies have answered
with a definite positive (Robin, 1963; Knoohuizen et al., 1972; Jenkins & Faison, 1974;
Fyfe, 1978; Meyer, 1980; Blumberg, 1981; Fyfe, 1981; Geller & Karales, 1981; Matulia,
1982; Donahue, 1983). However, as later researchers have pointed out, it is difficult to
identify whether such differences are due to dis-proportionate force against minorities or
minorities’ increased likelihood of encountering police or involvement in violent crime
(Wheeler et al., 2017; Cesario et al., 2019; Fryer, 2019).
Factoring in these differences, some researchers compared the proportion of
racial/ethnic minority force subjects to the proportion of crimes or violent crimes
committed by those minorities (Inn et al., 1977; Geller & Karales, 1981; Binder et al.,
1982). A related line of research explores whether Black civilians behave less respectfully
in encounters with police officers, resulting in an increased likelihood of escalation and
firearm discharge (Engel et al., 2000; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Mastrofski et al., 2002;
Alpert et al., 2004).
A recent line of research has used the counterfactual approach to examine racial bias
in officer-involved shootings, by comparing cases in which officers drew their firearms but
did not shoot with cases in which officers fired their guns (Wheeler et al., 2017; Worrall et
al., 2018; Cesario et al., 2019; Fryer, 2019). These researchers have concluded that Black
civilians are either no more likely or less likely to be shot by police, although Fryer (2019)
found that where less-lethal force is concerned, Black and Hispanic civilians continued to
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be more likely to experience use of force. These conclusions lend some credence to the
counter-bias hypothesis predicting under-vigilance with Black people, given officers’
concern with the consequences, such as departmental sanctions or media attention, of using
force against racial or ethnic minorities (James et al., 2013, 2014, 2016). Fridell & Lim
(2016) raise the possibility that both implicit and counter biases can be ‘at work depending
on the individuals, jurisdictions, and times’.
Other researchers have also sought to verify the effect of officer race on police use of
force, suggesting that in general, Black officers were not less likely to use force than White
officers, (Paoline III et al., 2016; Ridgeway, 2016; Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2017). Those
studies that found Black officers had a higher shooting rate than White officers also
suggested that the difference could be attributed to Black overrepresentation in off-duty
shootings, as they were more likely to reside in high-crime neighborhoods (Geller &
Karales, 1981; Fyfe, 1981). Using a matched case-control study in which shooting officers
were matched with non-shooting officers at the same scene, Ridgeway (2016) found that
Black officers were 3.3 times more likely to shoot than other officers. Raising the
possibility of an inflection point, Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2017) conduct an analysis which
suggests increasing minority officers may be associated with more use of force incidents
‘until, potentially, the percentage of Black officers grows quite large’, which may be
explained by some of the literature suggesting officers may be more likely to discriminate
against Black citizens or employ use of force because of increased pressure to subscribe to
prevailing organizational culture (Chrobot-Mason & Thomas, 2002).
Studies of individual officer characteristics generally find that encounters involving
younger and more inexperienced officers were more likely to result in higher levels of force
(Brandl et al., 2001; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Wolfe &
Piquero, 2011; Ridgeway, 2016). There is also a line of research considering the impact of
officer gender on force levels and excessive complaints, largely concluding that female
officers are less likely to receive excessive force complaints (Waugh et al., 1998; Brandl
et al., 2001; Chappell & Piquero, 2004) and use less force for the severity of resistance
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encountered (Bazley et al., 2007). Hoffman & Hickey (2005)’s analysis of use of force by
officers in a large suburban police department, however, found no statistically significant
differences between female and male officers found in overall rate of force. Some
differences found with regard to weapon use or suspect injury, but these differences were
small.
Situational and Organizational Characteristics Driving Police Use of Force
Situational factors, or ‘the structural factors of the immediate situation’ (Worden,
1989) are also thought to explain police violence. The situational factors that have been
correlated with officers’ decision to use force and severity of force include offense
seriousness or the reason for the initial call for service (Geller & Karales, 1981; Brown,
1984; J. M. MacDonald et al., 2003), suspect hostility, aggression, or resistance to arrest
(Alpert & Dunham, 1999; Morabito et al., 2012; Hine et al., 2018), and suspect impairment
(Alpert & Dunham, 1999; Alpert et al., 2004).
Organizational explanations for police violence, on the other hand, posit that
individual departments’ organizational policies and/or subculture affect the incidence and
severity of force. Early work by Fyfe (1979) showed that restrictive departmental policies
relating to firearm dis-charge and incident review procedures resulted in great decreases in
officer-involved shootings, line-of-duty officer deaths, and serious injuries, showing that
disruption of pre-existing depart-mental practice can result in great changes to use of force
outcomes. Further research on administrative policies has confirmed this (Fyfe, 1988;
Meyer, 1980; Binder et al., 1982; Sherman, 1983; Geller & Scott, 1992). Moreover, force
reporting requirements (Alpert & MacDonald, 2001) and departmental commitment to
education (Shjarback & White, 2016) tend to reduce force levels, while there is some
evidence that militarization, vis-a-vis police receipt of surplus military equipment,
increases deaths caused by police (Lawson Jr, 2019).
Lastly, there is a relatively new branch of the literature considering the impact of
officer networks on use of force. Premised on Roithmayr (2016)’s argument that use of
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force may spread between officers through a social contagion process, Ouellet et al. (2019)
use data from over 8,000 Chicago police officers named in multiple complaints to
reconstruct police misconduct ego-networks using complaint records to show that officer
involvement in excessive use of force complaints was predicted by having a greater
proportion of co-accused with a history of such behaviors. This was supported by QuispeTorreblanca & Stewart (2019)’s study of Metropolitan Police Service officers in London,
UK, which found that a 10% increase in prior peer misconduct increased an officer’s later
misconduct by 8%.
Sociological Explanations for Police Use of Force
While Worden (1989) might deem situational factors as the ‘the structural factors of
the immediate situation’, the role of non-immediate structural factors in determining police
killings also merit discussion. There are distinct differences between municipalities as
regards to demographics, policies, laws, and rates of crime and poverty that do not relate
directly to the organizational nature of the law enforcement agency, and this may explain
cross-sectional variation in police killings between agencies.
Crime is one of the major explanations for police use of force; in jurisdictions with
higher levels of violent crime, police officers may be faster to shoot in self-defense. Studies
have found that crime and police use of force are positively correlated in cross-sectional
studies (Fyfe, 1980; Jacobs, 1998; Kania & Mackey, 1977; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979).
While Langworthy (1986) suggests that the relationship is spurious when the association
is tested in time-series rather than cross-sectional data, J. M. MacDonald et al. (2001)
suggest that there is indeed a temporal relationship on the national level between crime and
police killings of civilians.
Other sociological explanations include firearm prevalence (Hemenway et al., 2019),
the size of police agencies (Garner et al., 2018) (however, the authors of that paper urge
caution in using their descriptive data as a basis for interpretation), and the political threat
hypothesis (Jacobs, 1998), in which cities with more Black people, a recent growth in the
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Black population, or higher levels of racial inequality, showed higher rates of police
killings of Black people.
Consent Decrees
Despite the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act’s (VCCLEA) key
role in legislating a tough on crime stance, the Act also introduced consent decrees, creating
the possibility of reform and accountability in municipal police departments. In the
policing context, consent decrees refer to agreements reached by the police department in
question and the Department of Justice, which are enforced by a federal court.
Given that consent decrees are multi-year agreements that seek to implement reform
in police departments, it stands to reason that consent decrees which address police use of
force might have some effect on levels of force, including lethal force. For example, the
Los Angeles Po-lice Department (LAPD)’s consent decree stipulated that the department
revamp its procedures, policies, and training relating to use of force. As a result, the
department increased its efforts to document and critically evaluate every incident of the
use of force, improve training, remind personnel to follow standard procedure in engaging
suspects, and to produce more careful re-views of use of force in individual cases (Stone
et al., 2009). More recently, the consent decree handed down to the New Orleans Police
Department (NOPD) prompted efforts to review body-worn camera footage to assess
compliance with stop, search and arrest policies created with procedural justice tenets in
mind, as well as the creation of a use of force scorecard to enhance ongoing reviews of all
instances of force (Morgan et al., 2017).
Much of the literature on consent decrees has been written by legal academics, who
are concerned with specific aspects of consent decree other than their efficacy in reducing
use of force. For example, Rushin (2017) has discussed the DOJ’s weaker position as a
‘repeat player’ whose incentive is to ensure ‘single player’ police departments do not
challenge the consent decree in court. Patel (2016) argues that consent decrees have by and
large lacked community involvement, with community engagement bodies feeling
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inadequately represented by the DOJ. Other academics have been more optimistic,
suggesting that consent decrees have been generally effective at reducing misconduct in
police departments (Rushin, 2013; Chanin, 2015).
In terms of force and related outcomes, an evaluation of the LAPD consent decree
process concluded that reform had truly been attained and public satisfaction had increased,
without the negative consequence of ‘depolicing’ (Stone et al., 2009), with a similar
evaluation of Pitts-burgh Police Department finding that reforms implemented under the
consent decree persisted after said decree ended (Davis et al., 2002). However, a study
examining racial disparities in motor vehicle stops before and after consent decrees were
implemented in the Los Angeles Po-lice Department, the New Jersey State Troopers, and
the New York Police Department found no clear effect (Kupferberg, 2008). A recent panel
data study (Powell et al., 2017) suggested that interventions may be associated with modest
reductions in the risk of civil rights filings, signaling reduced police misconduct and
increased satisfaction with police agencies. While the measure (civil rights filings) is
innovative, the paper faces limitations in that a DOJ intervention may reduce filings simply
because concerned parties such as civil rights organizations may greet the intervention as
a desirable outcome and, given that reform is ongoing, cease to use litigation as a strategy
for forcing reform.
No one has yet systematically evaluated the impact of consent decrees on a key
symptom of police misconduct: the number of people killed by police. The area is ripe for
empirical study, given the arguable exogeneity of the consent decree measure as a whole.
It has been noted that ‘without national statistics to develop a coherent enforcement
strategy, the DOJ relies on imperfect indicators’ such as existing civil suits, media coverage
of high-profile use of force cases, and whistle-blowers (Rushin, 2017). While the DOJ
decision to investigate suggests that the agency in question is in need of reform and/or has
engaged in undesirably high levels of force, not all agencies that require reform receive
intervention, which is imposed in a semi-random manner.
Data
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The goal of this research is to estimate the effect of DOJ intervention, including
consent decrees, on police killings. To do so, data from three different sources are used to
build a department-year panel dataset that spans the years 2000-2016. This section
discusses data sources and provides details on how the dataset was constructed.
Police Killings
Police killings are deployed as the dependent variable in the study. While the vast
majority of such deaths are caused by gunshots, the data includes deaths that are caused by
choking, beating, and other means that result from interactions with law enforcement.
While such deaths do not necessarily result from police misconduct, an important goal of
DOJ interventions concerning police use of force is to reduce deaths caused by the police.
As discussed in the literature review, official sources on the number of law
enforcement-related deaths are both inconsistent and under-counted. Amongst the crowdsourced information sources available on the Internet, Fatal Encounters, an incident-level
dataset that records police killings since Jan 1, 2000, was chosen. Data for Fatal Encounters
are collected via three methods: ‘(1) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and other public
records requests of law enforcement agencies, (2) crowdsourcing internet searches by
volunteers, paid researchers, and the curator of FE, and 3) cross-checking of data with
newly developing online websites such as those by The Guardian and Washington Post’
(Finch et al., 2019). Fatal Encounters has two key advantages over other crowd-sourced
datasets for several reasons. First, the number of years for which information is available
is greater than that of other well-known crowd-sourced datasets, given that many online
datasets track police killings from the year 2014 or later. Second, entries in the dataset are
rigorously collected and verified. Though it is acknowledged ‘there is no gold standard
with which to compare the completeness of the incidents collected in FE’ (Finch et al.,
2019), its estimate of an average of over 1,000 police killings each year suggests
concurrence with the findings of more recent institutional datasets such as that of the
Guardian, the Washington Post and FiveThirtyEight. Ozkan et al. (2018)’s comparison of
records of fatal officer-involved shootings from the Dallas Police Department (DPD) with
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crowd-sourced datasets, Fatal Encounters amongst them, showed that Fatal Encounters
showed the most convergence with DPD’s records, in terms of the number of reported
incidents. Moreover, while a good deal of variability was found between the official and
crowd-sourced data, this related to age and race records, with date records being
mismatched 7% of the time. Most of these mismatches occurred due to ‘a different account
of days rather than months of years’ (Ozkan et al., 2018); in other words, the differences
between Fatal Encounters and the official records related to details (age, race, days of
months) that were not used in this study.
For the purposes of this study, a key limitation of the Fatal Encounters dataset is one
shared by every other extant source of data on police killings: missingness, one that is
specifically acute in earlier years of the Fatal Encounters data. The dataset shows a steady
increase in the number of deaths reported each year from 816 in 2000 to 1,591 in 2016.
This may reflect a national year-on-year increase in people killed by police, but is unlikely
(Ouss & Rappaport, 2019); rather, the year-on-year increase in reported police killings
probably reflects either the increased public attention that police use of force has received
in recent years or the increased availability of online news reports. The discrepancy
between earlier and later years of data is accounted for via year fixed effects, as discussed
in the Methods section. Despite these flaws, the greater incompleteness of all extant data
sources suggests that Fatal Encounters provides the most comprehensive measure of deaths
caused by police.
Figure 1.1 shows the counts of people killed by police for which law enforcement
agencies included in the final dataset were responsible, comparing the SHR count with the
Fatal Encounters counts. Note that neither count represents all the police killings tallied in
that year by either Fatal Encounters or the SHR; only law enforcement agencies with a
jurisdiction over at least 30,000 people throughout the study period are included in the final
dataset. Even so, one can see a substantial disparity between the SHR count —which shows
an average of fewer than 200 police killings every year —and the Fatal Encounters count,
which logged between 400 and 800 police killings every year. However, a Spearman rank
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correlation showed a positive coefficient of .544, showing a large correlation between the
SHR count and the Fatal Encounters count —showing departments which reported more
deaths to the SHR also tended to be attributed to more deaths by the Fatal Encounters
dataset.
Federal Intervention
The independent variables considered in this study relate to different levels of federal
intervention in local police departments that seek to reduce use of force. Consent decrees
relating to other issues in policing, such as gender discrimination, are not included in the
study. Four different binary variables are employed to reflect levels of federal intervention:
investigation, the issuance of a technical assistance letter, a consent decree (this includes
collaborative agreements that are reached by the DOJ and police departments but are not
handed down by courts, memoranda of agreement, and state consent decrees), and the
appointment of a monitor to oversee the settlement. A value of 1 was entered for
departments in years during which that intervention was active, or had previously been
active (i.e. all post-treatment years), and 0 for pre-treatment years.
Cincinnati, which is somewhat unique among other cities in being under a
‘collaborative agreement’, was classified as being under a consent decree. For all legal and
practical purposes, the Cincinnati Police Department’s collaborative agreement was
similar to a consent decree. The main difference between it and other law enforcement
agencies under consent decrees relates to the amount of community involvement in the
reform process. While consent decrees are typically instigated by the DOJ, Cincinnati’s
agreement was with multiple parties, including ACLU of Ohio and the Cincinnati Black
United Front.
Additionally, it should be noted that consent decrees are usually, but not always,
followed by the appointment of a monitor to oversee the decree process. The role of the
monitor is to assess and report whether the requirements of the consent decree have been
implemented. However, not all monitors are appointed immediately following the
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implementation of the consent decree. In some cases there are a number of years between
the consent decree being handed down and the commencement of a monitor, and for those
years the department’s consent decree variable is coded as 1 while a 0 is entered for its
monitor variable. The appointment of a monitor to a law enforcement agency necessarily
suggests that the agency is already under a consent decree. There is, however, one key
exception in the final dataset.
New York Police Department (NYPD) is under court-appointed monitorship but not
technically subject to a consent decree. In August 2013, a federal court found that the
NYPD had behaved unconstitutionally in its use of stop, question and frisk, issuing an
order specifying remedies and appointing a monitor. However, technically speaking, the
court did not hand down a consent decree as defined by S 14141. Therefore, in NYPD’s
post-monitor years, a 1 was entered for the monitor binary variable but a 0 for its decree
variable.
Control Variables
Given that police killings likely vary due to numerous factors, the violent crime rate
and population of the relevant jurisdiction were included as control variables. The violent
crime rate is a measure of the dangerousness of the jurisdiction in a given police department
operates, while the larger a population, the higher the number of police killings each year
is likely to be. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
Program provided yearly data on crimes and arrests for law enforcement agencies. As UCR
reporting is not mandatory, some departments did not report consistently throughout the
study period and for this reason were excluded. The UCR data were used to calculate the
violent crime rate, which was used as a control variable, as well as a count of violent arrests,
which was used as a dependent variable. Population data were also derived from UCR
Program estimates. The study did not include other control variables that one might
consider relevant, such as rates of unemployment and/or poverty, race and age
demographics, as spatial and chronological variations in these variables would presumably
be accounted for in the time and agency fixed effects.
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Constructing the Dataset
There were some criteria for agencies’ inclusion in the final dataset. First, agencies
must be municipal police agencies, rather than sheriff’s offices, state police agencies, or
college or university police. Police departments which contracted out police services to
local sheriffs’ offices were also excluded. Second, these agencies must have a jurisdiction
over at least 30,000 people throughout the study period. While this necessitated the
removal of some agencies which had experienced federal intervention but had jurisdiction
over less than 30,000 people, most agencies where the DOJ had seen fit to intervene were
large municipal police departments with a higher baseline rate of police killings, raising
the concern that smaller agencies might not be comparable to such departments (Garner et
al., 2018). Third, these departments must have re-ported UCR data each year throughout
the study period, so that a violent crime rate could be calculated. There were a number of
units which raised concerns that some departments’ crime reporting may have been
incomplete during those years —showing markedly lower crime incidents than reported by
those departments in other years. Those department-by-year rows where the violent crime
rate was more than three standard deviations away from the mean violent crime rate of that
department over the study period were removed, resulting in 15 department-by-year rows,
or 0.9% of department-years, being dropped. Lastly, all agencies must have been
responsible for at least one police killing during the study period. All law enforcement
agencies that reported any federal intervention had reported at least one death over the
study period, and this criterion was therefore also extended to those comparison agencies
which did not experience any federal intervention in order to provide some baseline
comparability between those agencies which experienced federal intervention, and those
that did not.
The final dataset consisted of data for 962 agencies over the years 2000-2016. Of
these, 36 agencies had experienced any DOJ intervention. All 36 of these agencies had
been investigated by the DOJ, 14 had been issued a technical assistance letter, 20 had
experienced a consent decree during this period, and 15 were under court-appointed
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monitorship. The number of law enforcement agencies which had experienced any form of
federal intervention is small, because DOJ intervention is relatively rare. Since the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was passed, out of some 18,000 law
enforcement agencies across the U.S., fewer than 50 agencies have experienced any level
of DOJ intervention as sanctioned by that legislation.
Method
This research seeks to estimate the effect of DOJ intervention in municipal police
departments on law enforcement-related deaths, or police killings. Rather than undertaking
a cross-sectional analysis across cities, the study uses a within estimator to compare
changes within a given city between the period prior to intervention and the period postintervention.
While, on average, over 1,000 police killings take place every year, on a departmental
basis they are rare and observed counts are small. This distribution makes the Poisson
regression the most suitable method of analysis for data (MacDonald & Lattimore, 2010;
Wooldridge, 2010), with an equation for analysis as follows:
log 𝐸 𝑌&' = a + b+ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' + b6 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙&' +

b; 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒&' + b> 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟&' + d′&' •bA + g& + w'
Where 𝑌&' is the number of police killings measured in department i during year t, and
a is an intercept. 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' is a dummy variable for whether the department has
previously been subject to investigation, 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙&' is a dummy variable for whether the
department has been sent a technical assistance letter, 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒&' is a dummy variable for
whether the department has reached a negotiated settlement or signed a memorandum of
understanding with the Department of Justice, and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟&' is a dummy variable for
whether the court has appointed a monitor to oversee said settlement. d′&' is a vector of
department-level covariates (violent crime rate and the population over which the
department had jurisdiction), g& is an agency fixed effect to account for time-stable
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differences between departments, and w' is a year fixed effect to account for the year-onyear increase in the number of deaths reported by Fatal Encounters (reflecting the higher
rates of missing incidents in earlier years of data).
There are a number of challenges to the model as presented, which will be briefly
reviewed here. First, DOJ intervention is relatively rare. Since the VCCLEA was passed,
fewer than 50 agencies out of the some 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the U.S.
have experienced any level of DOJ intervention as sanctioned by that legislation. In this
study, the data include 36 post-treatment agencies. The agencies that experienced federal
intervention but were excluded, either did not have a population of at least 30,000 or did
not report UCR data every year throughout the study period.
Second, the timing of DOJ intervention is not random. The Department of Justice’s
investigation of law enforcement agencies tends to be prompted by high-profile use of
force cases, which may suggest higher use of force rates and more annual police killings.
To reveal under-lying trends in the pre-period, if any, descriptive analyses of police killings
before and after federal intervention, are first provided. Additionally, the event studies
undertaken, which explore the homicide rates of agencies in years prior to intervention,
provide a good test for agency trends prior to intervention.
Results
Descriptive Characteristics
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows that the average number of police killings in each
department per year is .672 in the Fatal Encounters data and only .132 in the SHR. 2.92%
of department-years (N = 463, 36 unique departments) were subject to DOJ investigations,
0.97% were issued a technical assistance letter (N = 153, 14 unique departments), 1.25%
(N = 198, 20 unique departments) were placed under a consent decree, and only .88% (N
= 140, 15 unique departments) had a court-appointed monitor.
Summary characteristics of departments, subdivided into groups based on whether
and when they had experienced federal intervention, are provided in Panel B of Table 1.1.
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Column 1 of that table describes the characteristics of departments which, throughout the
study period, never experienced any form of federal intervention. The second column
presents summary characteristics for those departments which did experience some form
of federal intervention, whether it was a DOJ investigation, the issuance of a technical
assistance letter, consent decree implementation, or the court appointment of a monitor.
Columns 3 and 4 disaggregate the departments included in Column 2, with the former
presenting statistics for departments in the years prior to intervention and the latter
presenting statistics for departments in the years succeeding it.
Unsurprisingly, departments that never experienced federal intervention were
responsible for fewer deaths per year (.554) compared to departments that did encounter
some form of intervention (3.51), at least according to Fatal Encounters data. However,
there were population differences between these two groups. Departments that never
experienced federal intervention had, on average, a smaller population with a mean of
112,771 persons, compared to those departments that had (744,332).
Within the group of departments that experienced federal intervention, mean annual
police killings were 4.38 prior to intervention and decreased to 3.21 after it. Furthermore,
there was an increase in the number of people under departments’ jurisdiction after federal
intervention; the effect of more federal interventions occurring in later years and natural
population growth in the United States. The violent crime rate also seemed to increase after
departments underwent federal intervention, from 1968 to 2206.
Figure 1.2 re-centers each agency from the year the federal intervention started and
compares it to other agencies in the same state within a twelve-year period: six years prior
to the intervention and six years after it. Figure 1.2(a) considers the effect of a DOJ
investigation, showing that treatment agencies saw more police killings than comparison
agencies throughout. However, while comparison agencies saw a slight increase in police
killings throughout the twelve-year period, investigated agencies see decreases in deaths
throughout. Figure 1.2(b) compares agencies that had technical assistance letters issued to
them, with agencies that did not. Agencies that received the intervention saw more deaths
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than agencies that did not. However, the similarities end there. While agencies that did not
receive technical assistance letters see a relatively stable number of deaths throughout,
agencies which received technical assistance letters saw a drastic increase —in deaths,
from less than 1 in T-6 to nearly 3.5 in T+6. There is a sharp dip in the two years
immediately following the issuance of a technical assistance letter before the number of
deaths rebounds and indeed surpasses the previous figure.
Figure 1.2(c) compares agencies placed under consent decrees, with agencies that
did not. The agencies which did not come under a consent decree showed a stable number
of people killed by police over the years. The agencies that had a consent decree imposed
on them saw an increase in deaths in the pre-treatment period, starting from an average of
two deaths in T-6 to slightly over four in T-4, before suddenly dipping to slightly under
three in the treatment year and a sharp rebound to slightly over four deaths in T+1. The
years that follow show a steady, if slight, decline in police killings thereafter. Figure 1.2(d)
considers agencies with court-appointed monitors. As ever, agencies without monitors
were responsible for fewer deaths and the number did not change drastically throughout
the time period. For agencies with an appointed monitor, the number of people killed by
police peaked at T-1 before showing a drastic decline in the treatment year. This was
followed by a steady increase in deaths until T+3 and a decline afterwards. Overall, it
would be fair to say that agencies with court-appointed monitors showed an increase in the
number of deaths during the pre-treatment period and an overall decrease in deaths during
the post-treatment period. However, the graphs are merely descriptive. The regression
results constitute the main analysis.
Regression Results
Table 1.2 presents the main results for the study. Moving from left to right, the first
column shows the result for the binary variable representing whether or not an agency has
been appointed a monitor by a federal court, the second column shows the result for the
consent decree, the third column shows the result of a technical assistance letter being
issued, and the fourth column shows the result for a DOJ investigation being opened for a
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particular law enforcement agency. The first row of each column shows the incidence rate
ratio (IRR) of the coefficient, and subsequent rows report the standard error, p-value, and
confidence interval.
Court-appointed monitors have a negative and significant effect on the number of
people killed by police. With an IRR of .709, this suggests that following the appointment
of a monitor, law enforcement agencies see a reduction in police killings of 29.1%, with a
p-value of .004 that is comfortably beneath the conventional .05 threshold. The 95%
confidence interval suggests that at its highest, the IRR goes up to .917, suggesting a
conservative estimate of a 8.3% reduction in police killings. However, the implementation
of a consent decree (Column 2) shows no significant results. The IRR suggests an increase
in police killings following the consent decree, but the standard error is too large for
significance.
On the other hand, the third column showing returns for the issuance of a technical
assistance letter suggests that not only does a technical assistance letter not decrease the
number of police killings an agency is responsible for, they actually increase it. The nature
of the increase is large —an IRR of 1.857 suggests an increase of 85.7%.
The rightmost column gives the result for the investigation variable. Similarly to
the monitor appointment result, it suggests that DOJ investigations have a negative and
significant impact on police killings. An IRR of .730 suggests a decrease in police killings
by 27%.
Event Study
The event study exploits the fact that there is heterogeneity in the timing of consent
decree implementation. It implicitly assumes that among departments which experience
consent decrees during the time period of the study, departments which have not yet had
the consent decrees implemented in certain years are a good control for departments which
have had the consent decree implemented for them. Given that consent decrees are a multiyear reform effort, a department which has experienced four years of consent decree-
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related change should show different treatment effects from a department that only entered
into the consent decree in that year. Moreover, a department that entered into the consent
decree in 2001 should in 2003 be in the same position that a department, which had its
consent decree implemented in 2009, is in 2011.
The equation for analysis is:
A

bB 𝐼 𝐷&'B = 1 + dF &' bA + g& + w' + e&'

log 𝑌&' = a +
BC DA

Ds represents the event dummies, which are equal to one when the variable of
interest was implemented s years ago in the department i as of year t . The analysis is
performed using police killings within five years (before and after) of implementation for
each department, with standard errors being clustered at the department level. By
conducting an event study, one can evaluate both whether there is a trend in police killings
before the particular intervention, and how levels of police killings change, on a year-onyear basis, after the intervention. Note: s=0 or year of implementation is the reference year,
and as such was excluded from the regression.
Each graph in Figure 1.3 plots the coefficients and their confidence intervals
following the Poisson regression of police killings on event dummies and controls. Figure
1.3(a) shows the graph for the dynamic effects of court-appointed monitors on police
killings. The horizontal axis represents the dummy variables for the number of years prior
to and after DOJ intervention. The vertical axis represents the IRR for the dummy variables,
with IRR = 1 indicating no change. The dot marks the point estimates and the error bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals. With the single exception of T = -4, the bars
suggest that there are no marked pre- and post-treatment trends, given that the error bars
on each of the dummy variables range across IRR = 1. Figure 1.3(b), which represents the
dynamic effects of technical assistance letters. As with Figure 1.3(a), the confidence
interval bars suggest there are no marked pre- or post-treatment trends with the exception
of T = -4 and T = 0, which show a decrease in police killings four years prior to the issuance
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of the technical assistance letter and an increase in police killings the year the technical
assistance letter was issued respectively. Figure 1.3(c) shows the event study graph for
DOJ investigations. Here the error bars, again representing 95% confidence intervals, again
suggest no marked pre- or post-treatment trends, except for T = -4 which once again shows
a decrease in police killings. Table 1.7 provides results from the event studies.
Robustness Checks
This section provides checks on the robustness of the main results. Six separate checks
are run: first, the negative binomial regression is used in analysis, instead of the Poisson
model employed in the main results. Second, an analysis is run on a reduced panel dataset
of the 36 agencies which received DOJ intervention and a smaller sample of comparable
agencies. Third, another analysis is performed for a further reduced panel dataset of only
agencies which received DOJ intervention. Fourth, SHR felonious killings are employed
as the dependent variable. Fifth, the analysis is re-run, each time dropping a single agency.
The last check uses a randomization inference to confirm that results were more reliable
than placebo treatment effects.
Negative Binomial Regression
The negative binomial regression is an alternative count model to the Poisson
model. Poisson models are often used in criminological studies, despite the assumption
that conditional mean and variance are equal being rarely met, for three reasons: first, the
latter is more efficient and robust than the negative binomial model (Wooldridge, 2010).
Second, the counts observed for crime are often small, thus making the skewed nature of
the Poisson distribution preferable to Ordinary Least Squares. Second, despite evidence
of over- or under-dispersion, Poisson is preferable to alternative models if the researcher
entertains the possibility that not all important parameters have been included
(MacDonald & Lattimore, 2010).
Given the overdispersed nature of the police killing data, performing a negative
binomial regression provides a useful check on the robustness of the main results. These
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results are provided in Table 1.3, and are broadly similar to that reported in the main
analysis, with the monitor appointment variable giving an IRR of .681 that is statistically
significant at p = .018.
Analysis of Reduced Panel Dataset
The analysis is run on a reduced panel dataset, comprising the 36 agencies which
received DOJ intervention and a subset of ‘control’ agencies with a population larger or
equal to the median population of the treatment agencies (333,420). There were 41
agencies that met this criterion, thus making a total of 77 agencies.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1.4. The monitor appointment
and technical assistance letter coefficients remained significant, with an IRR of .721 and
1.854 respectively, similar to the main results. The coefficient for investigation was also
similar to that of the main result with an IRR of .791, and the p-value was just above the
conventional .05 standard at .058. The consent decree variable was insignificant, as in the
main result.
Analysis of Further Reduced Panel Dataset
The analysis is run on a panel dataset of just the 36 agencies with DOJ
intervention, which provides 612 observations during the 17-year period. This strategy
helps test for within-department variation in police-involved killings over time by
arguably providing better comparability. Despite the care taken to select a group of
agencies comparable to those which experienced DOJ intervention by requiring at least
one police killing over the study period and a jurisdiction over a population of 30,000, it
may be that those agencies which had not experienced DOJ intervention were simply too
different from the agencies that received the treatment. However, it is not without its
disadvantages: reducing the number of agencies in the dataset will cause increased
standard errors and therefore reduced significance. However, if the coefficients remain,
this will suggest the main results are reliable.
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The results of this analysis are reported in Table 1.5. As predicted, the standard
errors in-creased following the reduction of the dataset, from .084 to .120 for the monitor
appointment variable. As a result, the coefficient is no longer significant. However, the
IRR remains in the same range: while the original IRR was .709, the analysis of the
reduced dataset was .796. Similar results are found for the other variables.
Using SHR Felonious Killings as the Dependent Variable
The third check performed uses the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report
(SHR)’s estimate of ‘felonious killings’ as a dependent variable in the analysis. The SHR
data are not accurate for the reasons discussed in the literature review, having a higher
level of missingness than the Fatal Encounters data.
Results are provided in Table 1.6. None of the results are significant, likely due to
the fact that the outcome is even more rare in the SHR data than it is in Fatal Encounters.
Re-running Analysis After Dropping Individual Agencies
To check if any single agency accounted for observed significant coefficients, the
main analysis was re-run, each time dropping an agency that had experienced a particular
level of federal intervention during the time period considered. These results are
presented in Tables 1.8-1.10. Table 1.8 reports coefficients given by the monitor variable,
where each agency which had a court-appointed monitor was dropped individually. Table
1.9 reports the results for the technical assistance variable where the analysis was run
after each agency that was issued with a technical assistance level was dropped. Table
1.10 reports the regression results for the investigation variable. Note: this analysis was
not repeated for the consent decree variable, as it was not significant in the main analysis.
Table 1.8 shows the results of re-running the analysis 15 times, each time
dropping an agency that had a monitor appointed during the time period considered. The
range of IRRs (.694-.752) reported are broadly similar to the IRR reported in the full
analysis (.709). All the coefficients are also statistically significant at the .05 threshold
with one large exception —the coefficient that emerges when New York Police
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Department is dropped from the analysis is not statistically significant at the .05
threshold, or even a .1 threshold. Although the point estimate of .752 is relatively close to
the original incident rate ratio, the standard error of .229 is more than two and a half
times larger than the original standard error of .084.
Table 1.9, which provides results for the effect of this check on the technical
assistance letter, provides a range of IRRs (1.652-2.128) that are again similar to the
original coefficient (1.857). This time, all coefficients are statistically significant.
Table 1.10 presents the results for the largest number of re-run analyses, dropping
a single agency 36 times. This is unsurprising, given that DOJ investigation is a necessary
preliminary to other forms of federal intervention. In any case, the range of IRRs
(.695-.801) is similar to the original IRR of .730. All coefficients are statistically
significant.
Randomization Inference
The last robustness check involved a randomization inference to confirm that
results from the main regression were more reliable than placebo treatment effects. This
was done by randomly assigning the treatment vector —the year a department
experienced an investigation, technical assistance letter, or court-appointed monitor —to
each department in the dataset. The treatment vector was assigned 1000 times. For the
monitor variable, the actual result was in the 99.6th percentile of treatment vectors,
suggesting a larger effect than 99.6% of randomly generated vectors. For the technical
assistance and investigation variables, the real coefficient was in every case the largest
effect.
Conclusion
Given the current administration’s lack of interest in pursuing or enforcing
consent decrees with local police departments and its efforts to postpone the
implementation of the last consent decree of the Obama administration in Baltimore
(Huseman & Waldman, June 15, 2017), the prospect of police accountability through
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federal intervention seems increasingly distant in the contemporary moment. Yet this
study suggests that federal intervention has some effect on police killings. Less certain
are the contours of that effect.
The results of the study suggest that investigations by the Department of Justice
into law enforcement agencies’ potential engagement in a ‘pattern or practice of
misconduct’ reduces killings by 27% (IRR .730). The various courses of action available
to the DOJ following that investigation have differing effects on homicide levels
thereafter. The DOJ may decide to take no further action, in which case the original
reduction persists. Alternatively, it may choose to implement a consent decree without
the appointment of a monitor to oversee the decree process, after which there are no
significant changes in police killings. However, if the federal court which handed down
the consent decree also appoints a monitor, there is an apparent further reduction in
police killings by 29.1% (IRR .709).
This warrants some further scrutiny. As discussed, with one exception a
department must be under a consent decree to have a court-appointed monitor. However,
departments under consent decrees do not all have monitors. Given that the consent
decree variable returns a positive but non-significant coefficient (IRR 1.122), and the
monitor variable returns a negative and significant one (IRR .709), one might conclude
that by itself a consent decree settlement is not entirely effective in reducing police
killings. Only when a monitor is appointed by the court to oversee the reform process,
will it be effective.
However, there is one other explanation. Could it be that the NYPD, which is
currently under the oversight of a court-appointed monitor while not technically being
under a consent decree, is responsible for the somewhat incongruous result? The check
performed in re-running the regression analysis multiple times, each time dropping a
single agency from the data, supported this somewhat. While the monitor variable
remained robust otherwise, the coefficient became insignificant when the NYPD was
dropped from the analysis. However, while the standard error increased by over two
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times, the coefficient remained consistent with the range of results obtained by dropping
other agencies from the data. In other words, the NYPD result may simply be the effect
of removing a law enforcement agency with the densest data, population- and dependent
variable-wise, from the dataset. The event study confirms the robustness of the monitor
variable, the test statistics of which are presented in Panel A of Table 1.7, in that there
were no significant trends for the pre-period.
The Department of Justice’s decision to issue a technical assistance letter
represents a middle ground between taking no action following the conclusion of an
investigation, and embarking on the expensive and time-consuming process of
implementing a consent decree. This has the apparent effect of increasing deaths by
85.7% (IRR 1.857). Why should that be the case?
One possible explanation may be that such letters are perceived by law
enforcement agencies as mere slaps on the wrist, leaving agencies free to continue with
the status quo without implementing any of the policies outlined in the document. On the
other hand, agencies which are subject to the considerably more involved consent decree
process would not be able to proceed similarly. However, given that there has been no
empirical literature on the effects of technical assistance letters on police organizational
behavior, any theories put forward are purely speculative.
Lastly, it should be noted that these results are relatively fragile. In particular, two
of the robustness checks are suggestive: first, when a reduced panel dataset consisting of
only the 36 agencies that underwent DOJ intervention was analyzed, the monitor
appointment variable showed a coefficient similar to the main result, but which was
insignificant at the p<.05 level. Second, there was some evidence in the event study of
pre-treatment selection trends. For the monitor appointment variable, the dummy variable
for four years prior to intervention showed a marked decrease in the dependent variable,
providing less clear evidence for the effect of DOJ intervention on police killings than the
main analysis. However, that may also be a result of the already-rare police killings
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outcome becoming even rarer when year-dummy variables are used as the independent
variable.
This study employs police killings as an outcome. While this is a clear limitation,
given the incompleteness of extant data sources and the fact that deaths caused by police
are relatively rare, it also represents a key contribution in that an important goal of DOJ
intervention in local law enforcement agencies is to reduce use of force, and loss of life
resulting from such. Other outcomes, such as civil rights litigation against agencies for
disproportionate use of force, while valuable, are proxies for what this study seeks to
directly measure.
Policies affect police behavior. In this case, the aspect of behavior we are
concerned with is the use of lethal force. Other studies monitor the effect of federal
intervention on more frequent outcomes (Powell et al., 2017; J. MacDonald & Braga,
2019), while the collection of use of force data is often itself a key stipulation of consent
decree settlements (Morgan et al., 2017). These settlements tend not to be homogeneous,
with each department’s consent decree involving different stipulations. This study does
not measure the intensity of the scrutiny over any given department, or investigate
specific reforms adopted by departments under consent decrees. These results call for the
need to qualitatively assess differences in the structure and types of reforms agencies
underwent in response to DOJ interventions. In treating each individual level of federal
intervention as a homogeneous treatment, this study represents only a first step in
beginning to empirically evaluate federal intervention in local police departments.
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Paper 1 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
S.D.
Min.
Max.
Police killings (FE)
.672
1.97
0
44
Police killings (SHR)
.132
.348
0
4
Population
137832 356923
30106 8566917
Was subject to DOJ investigation
.0292
.168
0
1
Was issued technical assistance letter
.00966
.0978
0
1
Has come under consent decree
.0125
.111
0
1
Had court appoint monitor
.00884
.0936
0
1
Violent crimes per 100,000
1641
1131
3.053
7703
Arrests for violent crimes
1135
2431
0
46411
Officers killed by felons (SHR)
.0155
.173
0
9
Officers assaulted (LEOKA)
30.2
94.0
0
1805
(a) Panel A: Departmental characteristics
Variable (mean)

No
intervention

With
intervention

Before
intervention

After
intervention

Police killings (FE)

.554

3.51

4.38

3.21

Police killings (SHR)

.118

.479

.600

.436

112,771

744,332

606,802

793,343

Violent crimes per 100,000

1620

2143

1968

2206

Arrests for violent crimes

1004

4315

3330

4667

Population

(b) Panel B: Departmental characteristics of agencies by federal intervention status
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Table 1.2 Main Results
Consent decree

.709**

1.122

1.857**

.730**

se(b)

.084

.185

.368

.085

p

.004

.486

.002

.007

.709**

1.122

1.857**

.730**

exp(b)

[CI]

Technical assistance letter

Investigation

Monitor appointment

Observations = 15826
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Table 1.3 Negative Binomial Regression
Consent decree

exp(b)

.681**

.681**

.681**

.681**

se(b)

1.267

1.267

1.267

1.267

1.814**

1.814**

1.814**

1.814**

.716**

.716**

.716**

.716**

p
[CI]

Technical assistance letter

Investigation

Monitor appointment

Observations = 15826
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Table 1.4 Results for reduced panel dataset (77 agencies)
Consent decree

exp(b)

.721**

.721**

.721**

.721**

se(b)

1.185

1.185

1.185

1.185

1.854**

1.854**

1.854**

1.854**

.791*

.791*

.791*

.791*

p
[CI]

Technical assistance letter

Investigation

Monitor appointment

Observations = 1317
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Table 1.5 Results for further reduced panel dataset (36 agencies)
Consent decree

exp(b)

.796

.796

.796

.796

se(b)

1.153

1.153

1.153

1.153

1.944**

1.944**

1.944**

1.944**

.786*

.786*

.786*

.786*

p
[CI]

Technical assistance letter

Investigation

Monitor appointment

Observations = 612
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Table 1.6 SHR felonious killings as dependent variable
Consent decree

exp(b)

.853

1.020

.795

.863

se(b)

.174

.203

.126

.112

p

.435

.920

.148

.254

[CI]

[.571, 1.273] [.691, 1.506]

Technical assistance letter

Investigation

Monitor appointment

[.583, 1.085] [.670, 1.112]

Observations = 15826
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Table 1.7 Event study
Year

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

1

2

3

4

5

exp(b) .902

.649* .780

.842

.973

.973

.872

.882

.969

.725

se(b)

.226

.112

.110

.101

.186

.186

.204

.156

.134

.139

p

.680

.013

.078

.078

.888

.559

.888

.477

.820

.094

4

5

N = 15826
(a) Panel A: Event study for Monitor Appointment
Year

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

1

2

3

exp(b) .816

.543** .729

.937

1.551* .959

.786

1.197 1.100 1.199

se(b)

.279

.114

.231

.248

.303

.129

.163

.250

.232

.183

p

.551

.004

.318

.806

.025

.752

.247

.389

.651

.233

5

N = 15826
(b) Panel B: Event study for Technical Assistance Letter
Year

-5

-4

-3

-2

0

1

2

3

4

exp(b) 1.078 .658*** .920

1.073 .683** .881

.819

.975

1.003 .928

se(b)

.166

.075

.174

.144

.084

.122

.118

.191

.090

.097

p

.624

.000

.659

.598

.002

.361

.164

.895

.975

.477

N = 15826
(c) Panel C: Event study for Investigation
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Table 1.8 Regression results for monitor variable where agencies dropped individually
exp(b)

se(b)

p

Albuquerque Police Department

.709**

.085

.005

[.567, .904]

Cincinnati Police Department

.716**

.085

.005

[.567, .905]

Cleveland Police Department

.713**

.086

.005

[.563, .904]

Detroit Police Department

.733*

.091

.012

[.576, .934]

Los Angeles Police Department

.698**

.086

.004

[.548, .890]

Metropolitan Police Department
(D.C.)

.705**

.084

.004

[.558, .892]

Miami Police Department

.709**

.084

.004

[.562, .896]

Montgomery County Police
Department

.711**

.085

.004

[.563, .898]

New Orleans Police Department

.725**

.087

.007

[.573, .916]

New York Police Department

.752

.229

.350

[.414, 1.367]

Newark Police Department

.711**

.085

.004

[.563, .898]

Pittsburgh Bureau of Police

.709**

.084

.004

[.562, .895]

Prince George’s County Police
Department

.695**

.082

.002

[.551, .887]

Seattle Police Department

.694**

.083

.002

[.548, .878]

Suffolk County Police
Department

.708**

.084

.004

[.561, .894]

Law enforcement agency
dropped from analysis

[CI]
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Table 1.9: Regression results for technical assistance variable where agencies dropped
individually
Law enforcement agency
dropped from analysis

exp(b)

se(b)

p

[CI]

Austin Police Department

1.642*

.381

.029

[1.051, 2.595]

Bakersfield Police
Department

1.705*

.358

.011

Charleston Police
Department

1.928***

.382

.001

Cleveland Police
Department

1.823**

.393

.005

Detroit Police Department

1.925**

.449

.005

2.128***

.347

.000

Lorain Police Department

1.849**

.369

.002

[1.250, 2.735]

Miami Police Department

1.816**

.364

.003

[1.226, 2.691]

New Orleans Police
Department

1.843**

.372

.002

1.989***

.382

.000

Schenectady Police
Department

1.844**

.368

.002

Suffolk County Police
Department

1.859**

.396

.004

Warren Police Department

1.840**

.366

.002

[1.247, 2.717]

Yonkers Police Department

1.825**

.364

.003

[1.235, 2.698]

Inglewood Police
Department

Portland (Maine) Police
Department

[1.129, 2.573]
[1.308, 2.844]
[1.194, 2.783]
[1.219, 3.040]
[1.546, 2.930]

[1.241, 2.738]
[1.365, 2.899]
[1.247, 2.725]
[1.225, 2.821]
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Table 1.10: Regression results for investigation variable where agencies dropped
individually
Law enforcement agency
dropped from analysis

exp(b)

se(b)

p

Albuquerque Police
Department

.703**

.090

.006

Austin Police Department

.716**

.085

.005

Bakersfield Police
Department

.733**

.086

.008

.738*

.096

.020

Beverly Hills Police
Department

.730**

.085

.007

Buffalo Police Department

.732**

.085

.007

Charleston Police
Department

.723**

.084

.005

.738*

.106

.034

Cincinnati Police
Department

.732**

.086

.008

Cleveland Police
Department

.725**

.086

.007

Columbus Police
Department

.731**

.085

.007

Detroit Police Department

.729**

.089

.010

Eastpointe Police
Department

.730**

.085

.007

Inglewood Police
Department

.746*

.088

.013

Lorain Police Department

.732**

.085

.007

Los Angeles Police
Department

.709**

.081

.003

Metropolitan Police
Department (D.C.)

.738**

.085

.009

Miami Police Department

.731**

.085

.007

Montgomery County
Police Department

.730**

.085

.007

Mount Prospect Police
Department

.730**

.085

.007

Baltimore Police
Department

Chicago Police
Department

[CI]
[.547, .903]
[.568, .902]
[.583, .922]
[.572, .953]
[.581, .916]
[.583, .918]
[.576, .909]
[.557, .978]
[.580, .922]
[.575, .915]
[.582, .917]
[.573, .926]
[.581, .916]
[.593, .940]
[.583, .919]
[.566, .888]
[.588, .926]
[.582, .918]
[.582, .917]
[.582, .917]
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[.573, .906]

New Orleans Police
Department

.720**

.084

.005

New York Police
Department

.733**

.084

.007

.801*

.070

.011

.728**

.084

.006

.755*

.093

.022

Portland (Maine) Police
Department

.715**

.083

.004

Prince George’s County
Police Department

.728**

.086

.008

Providence Police
Department

.732**

.086

.008

Riverside Police
Department

.733**

.085

.007

Schenectady Police
Department

.730**

.085

.007

Seattle Police Department

.695**

.082

.002

Suffolk County Police
Department

.725**

.085

.006

Torrance Police
Department

.730**

.085

.007

Tulsa Police Department

.713**

.083

.004

[.582, .917]

Warren Police Department

.733**

.085

.007

[.573, .926]

Yonkers Police
Department

.729**

.085

.006

Newark Police Department
Pittsburgh Bureau of
Police
Portland Police Bureau

[.586, .918]
[.675, .950]
[.547, .903]
[.568, .902]
[.583, .922]
[.572, .953]
[.581, .916]
[.583, .918]
[.576, .909]
[.557, .978]
[.580, .922]
[.575, .915]

[.581, .916]
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Figure 1.1 Fatal Encounters vs. SHR counts of police killings
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Figure 1.2 Police killings before and after intervention

(a) Investigation

(c) Consent decree

(b) Technical assistance letter

(d) Monitor appointment
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Figure 1.3 Event study

(a) Monitor appointment

(b) Technical assistance letter

(c) Investigation
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PAPER 2. DEPARTMENTAL POLICY OVERSIGHT OF BODY-WORN
CAMERA TECHNOLOGY: WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE OFFICERINVOLVED SHOOTINGS
Abstract
Using a month-by-department panel dataset, a difference-in-difference estimation
analyzes the effects of body-worn camera coverage and policies concerning body- worn
cameras on officer-involved shootings in 36 of the 50 largest police departments across the
United States. Results suggested that while body-worn camera coverage alone did not
change the incidence of officer-involved shootings, departmental policies restricting
officer discretion on when cameras should be turned on decreased shootings by over 30%.
Based on the reduction in low-level arrests that resulted, there was some evidence that
body-worn cameras reduced officer-involved shootings by reducing police contact with
civilians. This study demonstrates the pertinence of policy oversight over body-worn
camera. Policymakers seeking to reduce use of force through the deployment of body-worn
cameras should consider and implement policies that guide camera usage.
Introduction
In the wake of a string of high profile officer-involved homicides in 2014 and 2015,
the Department of Justice announced in 2015 that it would award over $23 million in
funding for a body- worn camera pilot program to support law enforcement agencies
implementing the technology (Department of Justice, 2015). The explosion in the number
of body-worn camera programs over the past few years has not been limited to the U.S.
either, and has been described as a ’world-wide uncontrolled social experiment’ (Ariel,
2016, p. 745).
Despite a rapidly growing literature on body-worn cameras and their efficacy, less
attention has been paid to the policies that govern body-worn camera usage. Rules relating
to the re- lease of footage, officers’ and civilians’ privacy, and whether officers can review
camera footage before providing their statements in use of force incidents vary between
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police departments. Little is known about whether such policy variation has any effect on
outcomes such as use of force and crime.
Using data from 36 of the 50 largest police departments in the United States, this study
seeks to identify the effect of body-worn camera policies on officer-involved shootings,
widely considered the most severe expression of use of force. Where other studies have
sought to identify the effect of camera presence alone on use of force, this study evaluates
differences in police shootings after body-worn camera deployment, and whether any
changes in shootings vary by body-worn camera policy.
Literature Review
Policymakers and some scholars suggest that body-worn cameras can reduce citizen
complaints and use of force incidents by increasing the accountability and transparency of
police behavior (Ariel et al., 2015; Ariel, 2016; Ariel et al., 2017; Henstock & Ariel, 2017;
Jennings et al., 2015). Body cameras are said to enhance the ‘people-processing, peoplechanging, and environment-changing’ features of police organizations, by enhancing the
police organization’s capacity to scrutinize police decision-making, changing how officers
behave while on the ground, and deterring civilians from behaving badly while being
recorded (Koen et al., 2018, p. 969).
Thus far, the primary method for verifying the efficacy of body-worn cameras has
been randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Overall, the evidence suggests body-worn
cameras have a mixed or non-significant effect on use of force, with a meta-analysis of 10
RCTs concluding that while body-worn cameras may increase assaults on officers, they
had no discernible effect on police use of force (Ariel et al., 2016b). Lum et al. (2019)’s
review similarly suggested mixed findings. Four RCTs and one quasi-experimental study
suggested that officers wearing cameras used less force, but another four RCTs and four
quasi-experimental studies showed no statistically significant differences.
Ariel et al. (2016b) suggest that these mixed findings are a result of departmental
hetero- geneity in defining use of force. Another possible factor might be the use of officer
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shifts as the unit of analysis across the studies included in the meta-analysis. This meant
that officers who had previously been assigned to treatment shifts in which they would
wear body-worn cam- eras, could later be assigned to control shifts, in which they would
not wear the cameras. The experiment assumed that such officers who were on control
shifts would behave similarly to officers who had never worn body-worn cameras,
disregarding the risk of contamination across treatment and control groups.
Despite the proliferation of RCTs in the body-worn camera literature, rather less has
been said about the effect of administrative oversight over cameras on officer behavior.
Ready & Young (2015) produced the first study examining the effect of mandatory use
policies and officers’ technological preferences on body-worn camera activation, finding
that body-worn cam- era activation was more prevalent under a mandatory use policy
relative to a discretionary use policy. Moreover, the global multi-site RCT conducted by
Ariel et al. (2016a) found that mandatory use decreased use of force, in comparison with
officers who were granted discretion to wear and use body-worn cameras. As the Brennan
Center for Justice suggests, body-worn camera policy discussions are animated by ‘a
complex series of questions about privacy, surveillance, and access to the footage’
(Brennan Center for Justice, 2016, para. 1). The preliminary discussion of mandatory vs.
discretionary use of body-worn cameras has not been accompanied by research regarding
other body-worn camera policy rules. This is a particularly striking gap, given the research
that shows police departments’ administrative policies in general influence officers’
behavior, particularly with regard to use of force (Fyfe, 1979; White, 2001).
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, a coalition of over 200
national organizations concerned with civil and human rights, began their Civil Rights
Principles on Body Worn Cameras by warning that ‘[w]ithout carefully crafted policy
safeguards in place, there is a real risk that these new devices could become instruments of
injustice, rather than tools for accountability’ (The Leadership Conference on Civil and
Human Rights, 2015, para. 8). These civil rights principles mandated that departments must
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1. Develop camera policies in public with the input of civil rights advocates and the
local community...
2. Commit to a set of narrow and well-defined purposes for which cameras and their
footage may be used...
3. Specify clear operational policies for recording, retention, and access, and enforce
strict disciplinary protocols for policy violations...
4. Make footage available to promote accountability with appropriate privacy safeguards in place…
5. Preserve the independent evidentiary value of officer reports by prohibiting officers
from viewing footage before filing their reports
Accordingly, the Leadership Conference’s body-worn camera policy scorecard rates
each department’s body-worn camera policy on eight criteria: (1) whether the policy is
readily available to the public; (2) whether the policy appropriately limits officer discretion
on when to record; (3) whether the policy respects civilians’ personal privacy by
specifically protecting categories of vulnerable individuals from being recorded without
their informed consent; (4) whether the policy prohibits officers from reviewing footage
before filing their reports; (5) whether the policy requires the department to delete
unflagged footage within six months; (6) whether the policy expressly prohibits footage
tampering and unauthorized access; (7) whether the policy allows individuals who are
filing police misconduct complaints to view all relevant footage; (8) whether the policy
limits the use of biometric technologies to identify individuals in footage (The Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2017).
None of the departments considered by the scorecard meet all the criteria listed.
However, some of these departments meet more criteria than others. Some of the criteria
are more easily met: for example, most departments made their body-worn camera policy
publicly available, with 24 out of the 75 scored departments failing to meet the criterion.
None of the departments scored met more than five out of the eight listed criteria. Baltimore
and Cincinnati, two of the departments that met five criteria, both made their policy
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publicly available, limited officer discretion by requiring officers to activate their cameras
during calls and other activities, and protected footage against tampering and misuse
(Baltimore Police Department, 2018; Cincinnati Police Department, 2018). Baltimore
Police Department also adequately addressed personal privacy concerns by protecting
victims and witnesses from being recorded without their consent, and expressly limited
biometric searching of footage. While Cincinnati did not adequately address personal
privacy concerns by prohibiting recording via the relatively vaguely-worded provision of
‘where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy’, its policy limited the department’s
retention of footage by automatically deleting unflagged footage after 90 days, and
expressly allowed a recorded individual to view footage during a citizen complaint
investigation.
While both police departments in Cincinnati and Baltimore had BWC policies that
were relatively accountable in civil rights terms, the body-worn camera policy offered by
Seattle Police Department (2019) provides a counter-example. The department meets the
criteria of having the body-worn camera policy publicly available and appropriately
restricting officers’ discretion on when to record; however, the department did not meet
any other criteria as of May 2019.
For the present study, to understand whether departmental oversight of body-worn
cam- era use affects officer-involved shootings, three policy criteria that suggest a direct
effect on use of force are considered: whether the body-worn camera policy is publicly
available (‘policy available’), whether the policy limits officer discretion on when to record
(‘officer discretion’), and whether the policy expressly prohibits footage tampering and
unauthorized access (‘footage misuse’). These aspects of a body-worn camera policy, it is
suggested, might be expected to have some effect on the restriction of use of force as they
contribute to what Koen et al. (2018) have termed the environment-changing effect of the
technology: ‘deterring civilians and officers from behaving badly in the immediate context
of a police civilian interaction’, and furthermore preventing officers from ameliorating the
consequences of bad behavior through illegitimate means such as tampering with footage.

53

Data
Independent variables
Body-worn camera presence
This paper investigates the impact of the presence of body-worn cameras —as well
as depart- mental oversight over such cameras —on officer-involved shootings. The panel
dataset consists of month-by-department data on departments from 36 of the 50 largest
departments across the United States between January 2010 and December 2016. Not all
department-months were included in the dataset, for reasons that will be discussed
subsequently. The final dataset consisted of 2797 department-months.
The number of body-worn cameras available to the officers of a law enforcement
agency is measured as a fraction of the number of sworn officers in the department. The
number of sworn officers in a law enforcement agency each year was obtained from the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program.
Often, police departments would roll out body-worn cameras gradually over the
course of a year or more. The number of body-worn cameras was tracked from month to
month using news coverage of the camera roll-outs, departments’ annual reports, press
releases by the department in question or city government, and —if the department in
question had a court- appointed monitor as a result of being under a consent decree —
monitors’ annual reports. There was a certain amount of rounding up and down, given that
not all departments introduced body-worn cameras or started the next phase of their rollout
on the 1st of each month. When the rollout of body cameras was introduced near the
beginning of the calendar month, the department would be recorded as having that number
of body cameras for the whole of that month. When the cameras were rolled out near the
end of the calendar month, the department would be recorded as having that number of
body cameras from the beginning of the subsequent month. If no information on a
department’s body-worn camera program was found, the number of body-worn cameras
was coded as a 0 for the study period. However, given the amount of public attention body-
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worn cameras have received in recent years, it was common to find large departments’ lack
of body-worn cameras mentioned in news coverage. For example, when the Atlanta Police
Department announced at the end of 2016 that they would begin their body-worn camera
rollout over the next year, local news coverage asked (Ross & Wolfe, 2016): "What took
Atlanta so long to get body cameras?"

Where no information could be obtained on the precise number of body-worn cameras
in a police department for a specific month, linear interpolation was used to estimate this
value. Out of 464 department-months where there was some body-worn camera coverage,
27.6% (N = 128) had interpolated values of body-worn camera coverage. As there were
2797 department-months in total, this was 4.58% of the total number of rows in the dataset.
Rows where the body- worn camera coverage value was interpolated were dummy coded
as 1, to check the sensitivity of the main results after dropping rows with interpolated bodycamera coverage values.
Body-worn camera policy
Using the Conference on Civil and Human Rights’ body-worn camera policy
scorecard, which rates each department’s body-worn camera policy, three policy criteria
were created: whether the body-worn camera policy is publicly available (‘policy
available’), whether the policy limits officer discretion on when to record (‘officer
discretion’) , and whether the policy expressly prohibits footage tampering and
unauthorized access (‘footage misuse’).
The Conference on Civil and Human Rights’ body-worn camera policy scorecard
scores body-worn camera policies on a three-level scale. Each department receives a green
rating on specific policy criteria only if it fully satisfies the criteria. A yellow rating means
that the policy partially satisfies that criteria and there is room for improvement. A red
rating indicates that the policy either fails to address the issue or promulgates a rule or
guideline that is in opposition to best practice. Each department’s body-worn camera policy
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was scored by two people —one member of staff or student intern, and one senior member
of staff.
The scorecard is updated annually, providing links to each department’s policy online.
How- ever, departments with body-camera policies sometimes update their policies more
than once a year. In general, each policy document tends to note when department policy
was last updated, with these past policies also being available online. This allows one to
track month-to- month changes to each department’s body-worn camera policy. Where a
department changed their body-worn camera policy between years without the Policy
Scorecard rating it, I followed the Leadership Conference’s criteria in rating these policies.
Policy ratings were ultimately ex- pressed as a binary variable, with ’1’ for a green or ideal
rating and ’0’ for a yellow or red rating.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable used in this study is officer-involved shootings —both fatal
and non- fatal, an expression of use of force that overlaps substantially with, but is different
from, law enforcement-related deaths. While official estimates of the number of law
enforcement-related deaths are available through the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide
Report (SHR), the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) National Vital
Statistics System, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Arrest-Related Deaths (ARD)
program (active between 2003 and 2014), it is commonly acknowledged that all three
reporting programs, which report between 300-400 deaths yearly, under-report the number
of law enforcement-related deaths in each year (Banks et al 2014; Fischer-Baum 2014,
Zimring 2016; Feldman et al 2017; Loftin et al 2017). Furthermore, these counts estimate
the number of deaths caused by law enforcement in each year, by whatever means. In this
study, I obtained the counts of officer-involved shootings from a dataset published by
VICE News, a news organization, in 2017.
The dataset assembled by VICE News was the result of the organization’s efforts to
collect information on both fatal and non-fatal officer-involved shootings in the 50 largest
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law enforcement agencies across the United States (VICE News, 2017). The fact that VICE
News only partially achieved this may shed some light on the general difficulties
encountered in collecting reliable and complete information on potentially lethal use of
force, even in large and presumably well-resourced law enforcement agencies. Over a
period of nine months, VICE collected data on officer-involved shootings that happened
during the period that began in January 2010 and ended in December 2016, from large
police departments across the country. Out of the 50 departments for which information
was sought, VICE News could not access information on shootings by the Suffolk County
and Nassau County police departments. Additionally, there was only partial incident-level
information available for Montgomery County (Maryland)’s Police Department and the
total number of shootings for that department was not available. Therefore, VICE
proceeded to publish shooting data for 47 departments.
VICE News’ data on officer-involved shootings was published as an incident-level
dataset; for the purposes of the study, this was aggregated to a department-by-month
dataset. A check on the VICE data showed that where multiple persons were affected by
an officer-involved shooting, this was reflected in the data as separate incidents so there
could be no instances of under-counting (i.e., two or more persons shot by the same officer
during the same event being counted as a single incident). Additionally, there could be no
instances of over-counting in which a single shooting for which multiple agencies were
responsible were counted as multiple incidents. There were two shooting incidents where
multiple agencies were responsible. In both cases the other agency responsible were state
police, and since the study does not consider state police agencies these attributions were
simply dropped.
Given that this study uses a month-by-department dataset, five departments
(Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans, Newark, and Tampa) for which only yearly information
was available, that is, there was no information on what month shootings for these
departments took place, were excluded. VICE News’ data on officer-involved shootings
by the New York Police Department (NYPD) was similarly lacking in that it only included
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year, but not month, information. However, the NYPD’s annual reports for 2010-2015
provided monthly breakdowns of officer- involved shootings and these were used to
supplement the VICE News data. Unfortunately, a similar monthly breakdown of officerinvolved shootings by the NYPD in 2016 was not publicly available. Lastly, the dataset
was unbalanced as there were a further three cities which did not report the months of
shootings in certain years: Las Vegas from 2010 to 2012, Memphis from 2014 to 2016,
and Miami-Dade from 2014 to 2016. Six further departments had to be dropped from the
final dataset as there was no arrest data available for these (see control variable section).
Different law enforcement agencies may hold different definitions as to non-fatal
shootings. For example, a firearm discharge that does not result in any hits may be
considered a non-fatal shooting by some departments and not by others. To verify whether
the departments in the dataset had consistent definitions of non-fatal officer-involved
shootings, I considered the departmental incident narratives given for each shooting. While
many departments clearly considered firearm discharges not resulting in any hits a nonfatal shooting, this was less clear for nine other departments (Baltimore, Baltimore County,
Boston, DeKalb, Denver, Fairfax County, San Antonio, San Jose and Seattle Police
Departments) that either provided no information, information that was not complete, or
described no incidents where no hits were made. This suggests that these departments
operate on a different definition of a non-fatal officer-involved shooting, which may be
problematic for the purposes of comparing levels of shootings between departments.
Department fixed effects were employed to account for such differences.
Control variables
Crime and arrest data
Crime and arrest data were important controls for the purposes of the study. I included
monthly violent and property crime rates to establish the general dangerousness of the
jurisdiction. I also controlled for the number of arrests for Part I crimes, as well as arrests
for low-level offenses such as drug violations, violation of liquor laws, public drunkenness,
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disorderly conduct, vagrancy, all other non-traffic offenses, suspicion, and curfew and
loitering violations, which reflects the amount of police-civilian contact in a jurisdiction in
any given month.
However, not all agencies reported arrest data scrupulously every month. The City of
Miami, Miami-Dade, Jacksonville, New York City, Cincinnati, and Washington, D.C.’s
Metropolitan Police Departments did not report any data on low-level arrests, and as a
result they were dropped from the data giving a panel dataset of 36 police departments.
Some departments —including Phoenix, Portland, Prince George’s County, Baltimore
County, Indianapolis Metropolitan, and Seattle —did not report either Part I or low-level
arrests in some months, and those months were removed from the data, further contributing
to the unbalanced nature of the panel dataset. The Chicago Police Department (CPD) also
did not report monthly arrest data to the UCR. However, public arrest data for the years
2014-2017 were available on the CPD website, and this was used to supplement the UCR
arrest data although CPD arrest data for 2010-2013 could not be obtained.
Where there was missing data for low-level arrests, it did not make sense to fill in this
missing data via interpolation given that different departments make arrests for some lowlevel offenses and not for others. For example, Boston Police Department made zero arrests
for curfew and loitering violations throughout the study period. Given the high level of
departmental discretion to make arrests for low-level offenses, it did not make sense to
interpolate based on the distribution of monthly arrests for throughout the year given that
decisions about whether to arrest for a given department and how many arrests to make
likely varied between departments. The requirement that arrest data be included as a control
variable therefore necessarily reduced the number of rows, and unique departments, in the
final dataset. Considering that arrest levels are a useful proxy of the amount of policecivilian contact taking place in each jurisdiction, which can in turn affect the likelihood
that any one encounter with officer and civilian might escalate to the level of a shooting, I
decided that this was an important set of control variables to include. However, a further
check on the robustness of the results consisted of rerunning the regression without arrest
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control variables, on both the final dataset of 36 agencies and an expanded dataset of 42
agencies including departments that were initially dropped for lack of arrest data.
Other controls
Besides crime and arrest data, I included as controls demographic variables about the
population over which each law enforcement agency had jurisdiction were included: the
percentage of the population that was male, the percentage of the population that was white,
and the percentage of the population aged 15-24 years, as well as the size of the population
itself. While the yearly population was deployed as a control variable, the overall
regression was weighted via the size of the population in the first year of the study period.
These statistics were obtained from the American Community Survey.
I also included a dummy variable for whether the department is or has ever been under
a consent decree, because the federal consent decree is likely to affect the incidence of use
of force. Lastly, year-month and department fixed effects were included.
Summary statistics
With department-month as the unit of analysis, Table 2.1 shows the mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum of each variable. There was a mean of 1.067 officerinvolved shootings every month. Approximately 17.5% of department-months had bodyworn cameras, but across the whole of the study period 5.35% (N = 149) of officers in each
department had body- worn cameras. As for the policy variables, 131 department-months
had an ideal policy that restricted officer discretion as to when cameras must be switched
on. Two hundred and eighteen department-months made their body-worn camera policies
available to the public. Forty department-months promulgated ideal guidelines to prevent
misuse of footage recorded on the body-worn cameras. To clarify, these figures were
calculated including departments that had never introduced body-worn camera programs
and therefore could not possibly have ’good’ or indeed any type of body-worn camera
policies.
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Two hundred and forty-two department-months were experiencing, or had
experienced, consent decrees during the study period. This is unsurprising given that
consent decrees are relatively rare and fewer than fifty departments have been under such
decrees since their introduction in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (Rushin, 2017). The percentage is not lower because the study is restricted to the
largest police departments in the nation, and large police departments are more likely to
experience consent decrees.
There was a positive correlation between the policy variables of officer discretion and
policy availability (Spearman’s rank 𝑟B = .548, p < .001). There was also a significant but
small correlation between officer discretion and footage misuse (𝑟B = .301, p < .001).
Finally, there was a small but significant correlation between policy availability and
footage misuse (𝑟B = .223, p <.001). This suggests that departments with body-worn
camera policies that are ideal in certain aspects are not necessarily good across the board.
Formal test of parallel trends assumption
Out of the 36 departments in the study, 23 departments introduced body-worn cameras
during the study period while 13 did not (Table 2.4 provides a list and roll-out dates where
applicable). The parallel trends assumption has it that officer-involved shootings for these
groups were not trending in different directions prior to the introduction of cameras. In
order to test the assumption, a factor variable was created to indicate the difference between
the current month and the month in which body-worn cameras were introduced for that
department. A regression, with the number of officer-involved shootings as the dependent
variable, was then run on the interaction between that factor variable and the current month,
using the month prior to BWC introduction as the baseline. Thereafter, an F-test (testparm
in Stata) for the six months prior to BWC introduction was run to test the hypothesis that
the sum of the coefficients -6 to -2 would sum to zero, suggesting parallel trends prior to
treatment. The p-value on this F-test was .247 and a failure to reject the null hypothesis at
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the conventional p<.05 threshold, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption was
satisfied.
Method
A difference-in-difference estimation is used to analyze the month-by-department
panel dataset of fatal and non-fatal officer-involved shootings in 36 out of 50 of the largest
police departments across the United States between January 2010 and December 2016.
The analysis is conducted using a Poisson regression. Standard errors are clustered by
agency to account for serial correlation.
The equation for analysis is:
log 𝐸 𝑌&' = 𝛼 + 𝛽+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒&' + 𝛽6 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' + 𝛽; 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒&'
+ 𝛽> 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒&' + 𝛿&' + 𝛾& + w'
Where 𝑌&' is the outcome variable for the police department i in the year-month t, α is
an intercept, 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒&' is the number of body-worn cameras in each department
expressed as a fraction of the number of sworn officers in the department for that year and
month, 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' is an indicator variable for whether the department has an
ideal policy limiting officer discretion on when to record on the body-worn camera for that
year and month, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒&' is an indicator for whether the department makes its
body-worn camera policy publicly available, and 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑒&' is an indicator for
whether there are rules against tampering with body-worn camera footage. 𝛿&' is a vector
of department-level covariates, 𝛾& is a jurisdiction fixed effect, and w' is a time fixed effect.
Additionally, the effect of body-worn camera coverage on arrests and crime rates by
type (low level, violent, property) is estimated. While policymakers may be most
concerned to implement body-worn cameras in order to reduce use of force and other
undesirable police behaviors, they may also be concerned about whether body-worn
cameras may also have the unintended consequence of decreasing police proactivity, as a
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result affecting public safety. Arrests made for violent crimes and low-level arrests are
differentiated because violent crime arrests presumably cause less community backlash.
The key limitation to this study is that over the study period, only 3 out of the 36
departments changed their body-worn camera policies sufficiently to warrant a change in
their policy ratings. While departments with ‘good’ body-worn camera policies might
appear to see the greatest decreases in officer-involved shootings, it is possible that such
departments would possess other organizational characteristics or make certain other
choices, which are the true cause of fewer shootings. Alternatively, jurisdictional
characteristics could have a greater effect on officer-involved shootings. Generally, as
police departments rolled out body-worn cameras over the study period, they would go
from having no policies governing body-worn cameras to having a policy providing
oversight over the technology. Despite this change, and despite the fact that departments
with body-camera policies sometimes update their policies more than once a year, it was
rare for departments to substantially change their policies such that the ratings they
received from the Conference on Civil and Human Rights would change from red or yellow
to green, or vice versa. To address this limitation, a range of variables are used to control
for jurisdictional and demographic characteristics, crime rates, and departmental
characteristics, like the number of low level arrests made and consent decree
implementation. Additionally, departmental fixed effects control for the time stable
differences between agencies.
Results
Main regression analysis
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the results of the main regression analysis. The results
are presented as Incident Rate Ratios (IRR), and suggest that restricting officer discretion
on when to turn on body-worn cameras has a negative and significant impact on officerinvolved shootings, reducing them by 33.3% (IRR .666). Surprisingly, the amount of bodyworn camera coverage did not seem to significantly affect the number of officer-involved
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shootings in a department. While the IRR was less than 1, indicating a negative effect, the
result is not significant. Neither pol- icy availability nor the presence of guidelines
preventing misuse of body-worn camera footage seemed to affect officer-involved
shootings either.
Arrests as the dependent variable
Preventing officer-involved shootings is obviously a desirable outcome. However,
if the effect of body-worn camera policies is that law enforcement officers engage in depolicing by retreating from active police work and initiating fewer encounters with
civilians, the benefits of a robust body-worn camera program become less clear-cut,
warranting further consideration of the policy trade-offs surrounding such an initiative.
There is some evidence to support the phenomenon of de-policing, with (Shjarback et al.,
2017) suggesting that the increased scrutiny of law enforcement in the post-Ferguson era
appears to have had an impact on traffic stops and hit rates in Missouri. In order to evaluate
this potential mechanism in which body-worn camera policies affects the incidence of
officer-involved shootings through a lower level of police- civilian encounters in general,
arrests were used as a proxy measure for the amount of contact between law enforcement
officers and the public and used it as an outcome variable, given body-worn camera
coverage and departmental policies governing camera usage.
This analysis was conducted twice: first considering the number of arrests made for
Part I crimes per 1,000 civilians, and second considering arrests made for low-level
offenses per 1,000 civilians. The ostensible ‘Ferguson effect’ consists not only in depolicing as a result of increased scrutiny of police action, but also in the increase of crime
as a result of said de-policing has. Therefore, the effect of body-worn camera
implementation on Part I arrests was a distinct question from whether body-worn cameras
caused police to make fewer arrests for quality-of- life offenses such as drunkenness or
vagrancy, given that it has suggested that, from a com- munity standpoint, the latter might
even be beneficial (Shjarback et al., 2017; Gau & Brunson, 2010). Panel B of Table 2.2
provides the results for Part I arrests. The analysis suggested that the amount of body-worn
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camera coverage had no significant effect on Part I arrests, while guide- lines against
footage misuse decreased the number of arrests made for Part I offenses by 16% (IRR .840).
The effect on low-level arrests is reported in Panel C of Table 2.2. Here, both the
officer discretion and footage misuse variables were found to reduce the number of lowlevel arrests made. With an IRR of .866, the result for the officer discretion variable
suggests a reduction in low-level arrests of 13.4%. With an IRR of .651, it is suggested an
even larger decrease in low-level arrests follows from addressing potential misuse of bodyworn camera footage —a reduction of 34.9%.

Body-worn cameras’ effect on crime
Panel D of Table 2.2 shows the results when the violent crime rate is taken as the
dependent variable. Body-worn camera coverage, and policies relating to body-worn
cameras, did not seem to significantly affect the violent crime rate. However, the effect of
body-worn camera policies on the property crime rate —reported in Panel E —tells a
slightly different story. There, it is shown that making a department’s body-worn camera
policy available has the effect of raising the property crime rate by 2.9%.
Robustness Checks
Dropping agencies that never had body-worn cameras
To check if individual policies really had more of an effect on officer-involved
shootings than the amount of body-worn camera coverage in a department, I dropped those
law enforcement agencies that did not have any body-worn cameras during the years
between 2010 and 2016. That is, departments that had no pre-existing body-worn camera
program and did not introduce a body-worn camera program during this time were
excluded, while departments that had zero cameras in some months were included so long
as cameras were introduced in subsequent months. This left us with a dataset of 22 agencies.
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The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.3. As with the main results (Table
2.2, Panel A), officer discretion was shown to have a significant negative effect on officerinvolved shootings. The IRR of .657 is fairly similar to the original IRR of .666 reported
in Table 2.2.
Dropping rows with interpolated body-worn camera coverage
As discussed earlier in the data section of this paper, where no information could
be obtained on the precise number of body-worn cameras in a police department for a
specific month, I used linear interpolation to estimate this value. 128 department-month
rows had interpolated values of body-worn camera coverage, which strictly speaking did
not accurately represent the fraction of a department’s officers who had body-worn
cameras in a month. These were dropped so the analysis could be re-estimated.
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the results of this analysis. None of the policy
variables have any significant effects on officer-involved shootings —at least according to
the conventional p < .05 threshold. Officer discretion results in a 30.6% (IRR .694)
reduction in officer-involved shootings. While the p-value is above the .05 level, at .076 it
is rather close.
Dropping control variables relating to arrest
In the main analysis, arrests for both Part I crimes and low-level offenses were included,
as these were thought to establish the amount of police-civilian contact in a jurisdiction.
How- ever, controlling for arrests may potentially obscure the effect of body-worn cameras.
That is, if the implementation of body-worn cameras leads to a ‘depolicing’ effect by
causing officers to approach civilians less often, for which arrests serve as a proxy factor,
thus leading to fewer officer-involved shootings, then including arrests as a control would
weaken the effect of body- worn cameras on officer-involved shootings. This proposed
mechanism was previously tested in Section 4.3. In this section we turn our attention to the
impact of body-worn camera policies on officer-involved shootings, disregarding arrests
made.
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The analysis was conducted three times. First, with the original dataset of 36 law
enforcement agencies. Second, the analysis was repeated with the reduced dataset
consisting only of 22 agencies that had body-worn cameras at some point between 2010
and 2016. Third, a larger dataset of 42 agencies was included, as agencies that were
removed from the dataset due to a lack of arrest data could be included again.
Results for these analyses are reported in Panels C, D, and E of Table 2.3. Panel C
—showing the results for the analysis performed on 36 agencies and thus directly
comparable to the analy- sis including arrest controls shown in Panel A of Table 2.2 —
showed similar results to the original analysis, in that only officer discretion was shown to
have a significant effect on shootings, with an IRR of .658.
Panel C of Table 2.3, which shows the result of the analysis performed on 22
agencies, showed similar results. Only the officer discretion variable remained significant
with an IRR of .666.
Panel D of Table 2.3 shows results given by an analysis of 42 departments. The
officer discretion variable had a negative and significant IRR of .703. Interestingly, the
footage misuse variable also remained significant, showing an IRR of 1.287 or an increase
in shootings by 28.7%.
Dropping individual agencies
At this point, it seems relatively clear that the officer discretion variable (i.e.,
whether police departments restrict discretion on when officers turn on their body-worn
cameras) has had the most consistently significant effect on officer-involved shootings. To
check if any single agency accounted for this result, I reran the analysis 36 times, each time
dropping an agency that implemented body-worn cameras at any time during the time
period considered.
Figure 1 shows the range of IRRs returned for the officer discretion variable, which
has consistently been significant. The graph shows an IRR ranging between .597, when
San Diego Po- lice Department was dropped from the data, and .781, when Dallas Police
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Department was dropped. With four exceptions, the p-values produced remained beneath
the .05 threshold when each agency was dropped from the dataset. These exceptions are
shaded pink in Figure 1 and labelled with their p-values: three of the models where
Albuquerque, Denver, and Houston were dropped show p-values just about the .05
threshold. The last department is Dallas Police Department. When it was dropped from the
dataset, the coefficient produced had a p-value of .237.
Discussion
While body-worn cameras in and of themselves do not reduce the number of
officer-involved shootings that take place within law enforcement agencies, restricting
officer discretion as to when body-worn cameras should be turned on does have a negative
and significant impact on officer-involved shootings. The result remains robust to a number
of checks: when agencies which never had a body-worn camera program throughout the
study period were dropped from the dataset, and when arrest controls were excluded. It
should be noted that the p-value rose above the conventional p < .05 threshold when rows
with interpolated values for body-worn camera coverage were excluded from analysis;
however, with p = .076 and a standard error of .143, the result should not be discounted
entirely. When each individual agency was dropped from the dataset and the analysis was
rerun 36 times, the officer discretion variable continued to be significant with one
exception: when Dallas Police Department was dropped, producing an IRR of .790 with a
standard error of .163 and a p-value of .237. In contrast, the standard error from the main
regression analysis, which can be found in the third column of Panel A in Table 2.3,
was .108.
There is little evidence that other policies —guidelines that protect footage against
tampering and misuse, and making body-worn camera policies available to the public —
change the number of officer-involved shootings taking place. There is also no evidence
that the amount of body-worn camera coverage available to a department changes officerinvolved shootings. It is perhaps counter-intuitive that the actual presence of body-worn
cameras, or the probability that an officer will be wearing a body-worn camera when they
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encounter a civilian while on duty, does not affect their likelihood of engaging in a shooting
when the substance of departmental oversight over the body-worn cameras that individual
officers may not even be wearing does.
In and of itself, the idea that restricting officer discretion with regards to body-worn
camera usage can decrease officer-involved shootings makes sense. After all, body-worn
cameras’ ability to affect and restrain behavior is probably most efficacious when they are
actually turned on. But the finding that protecting footage against tampering and misuse
tends to increase officer-involved shootings is less intuitive. After all, if officers cannot
tamper with footage after the fact, that should increase the costs associated with a shooting
that are borne by an individual officer. A potential explanation is that the inclusion of antimisuse guidelines in a policy increases officer resistance to body-worn camera programs
in a way that other guidelines do not, but this is neither clear nor certain.
Body-worn camera coverage and policies had no significant effect on the violent
crime rate. However, making a department’s body-worn camera policy publicly available
increased the property crime rate by 2.9%. The mechanism for this is unclear —reading a
department’s BWC policy online presumably does not reassure a small but critical minority
of property crime offenders who then feel free to proceed with impunity. Further research
will be needed to understand this apparent relationship.
Speculation that increased scrutiny of police would lead to decreased officercivilian contact was somewhat vindicated. Arrests for serious (Part 1) offences were not
much affected by body-worn camera coverage itself. However, the footage misuse policy
again reduced the number of arrests made. The most straightforward explanation —similar
to the explanation pro- posed as to why guidelines against footage misuse might increase
officer-involved shootings—is that guidelines against footage misuse created a perception
amongst officers that body-worn cameras enabled a department to surveil officers and so
was ‘against them’, thus discouraging them from the police work. Again, not much can be
done to test this speculation without further research.
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The footage misuse policy variable reduced low-level arrests by nearly 35%
(IRR .651) and the policy restricting officer discretion reduced them by an estimated 13.4%
(IRR .866). This result does at least suggest that body-worn cameras reduce officerinvolved shootings, at least partly through reducing arrests for low-level or ‘quality of life’
offences. Some who question the need for ‘quality of life’ policing (Gau and Brunson 2010)
might consider this a neutral or even positive development, while others might consider
de-policing a profoundly dangerous phenomenon. In any case, this is an indication that
body-worn cameras do not reduce officer- involved shootings solely through improving
officer and/or civilian behavior during encounters in which officers and civilians come
face-to-face, but also through reducing the likelihood that officers and civilians would
encounter each other in the first place.
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Paper 2 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean S.D.

Min. Max.

Officer-involved shootings

1.067 1.584

0

11

.380

0

1

Percentage of officers with body-worn cameras

.0535 .190

0

1

Officer discretion

.0468 .211

0

1

Policy available

.0779 .268

0

1

Footage misuse

.0143 .119

0

1

Consent decree

.0865 .281

0

1

Violent crime rate

170

84.9

23.1

638.9

Property crime rate

343

137

24.3

818

Percentage of population that is male

49.0

1.06

47.0

51.0

Percentage of population aged 15 – 24 years

14.8

2.05

9.80

22.2

Percentage of population that is white

57.8

15.4

20.4

83.7

Monthly arrests for murder

4.912 5.459

0

58

Monthly arrests for rape

14.11 16.27

0

122

Monthly arrests for assault

622.4 473.461 4

2828

Monthly arrests for robbery

53.76 53.065

0

345

Monthly arrests for burglary

57.43 41.839

3

296

Monthly arrests for larceny

310.5 198.288 0

1501

Monthly arrests for motor vehicle theft

31.58 34.13

376

Monthly arrests for drug violations

59.65 211.286 0

2786

Monthly arrests for DUIs

29.81 27.964

0

337

Monthly arrests for liquor offenses

17.84 12.415

0

47

Monthly arrests for drunkenness

12.68 14.932

0

43

Monthly arrests for disorderly conduct

25.87 13.342

0

50

Monthly arrests for vagrancy

5.742 8.100

0

35

Monthly arrests for other non-traffic offenses

54.61 115.98

0

1450

Whether department had body-worn camera .175
program

0

71

Monthly arrests for suspicion

.0554 .449

Monthly arrests for curfew violations and loitering 4.149 4.756

0

7

0

16

72

Table 2.2 Main Results
BWC Coverage

Policy Available Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.777

.985

.666*

1.108

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.269

.161

.114

.129

.467

.925

.018

.377

p
N = 2797

(a) Panel A: Officer-involved shootings as dependent variable
BWC Coverage Policy Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.946

1.096

1.019

.840**

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.074

.059

.052

.047

.474

.086

.721

.002

p
N = 2797

(b) Panel B: Part I arrests as dependent variable
BWC Coverage Policy Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

1.000

1.031

.866*

.651***

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.071

.053

.059

.050

.995

.552

.036

.000

p
N = 2797

(c) Panel C: Low-level arrests as dependent variable
BWC Coverage Policy Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.917

.949

1.040

1.012

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.072

.045

.038

.047

.265

.269

.286

.807

p
N = 2797

(d) Panel D: Violent crime rate as dependent variable
BWC Coverage Policy Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.959

1.029

.985

1.003

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.023

.012

.012

.009

.079

.015

.228

.705

p

73

N = 2797
(e) Panel E: Property crime rate as dependent variable
All models are estimated using population weights.
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Table 2.3 Robustness Checks
BWC Coverage Policy Available

Officer
Discretion

Footage
Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.737

.989

.657*

1.169

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.262

.160

.108

.176

.390

.945

.010

.299

p
N = 1833

(a) Panel A: Regression results excluding agencies that never had BWC
BWC
Coverage

Policy
Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.771

.948

.694

.841**

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.291

.196

.143

.188

.491

.795

.076

.438

p
N = 2669

(b) Panel B: Regression results excluding rows with interpolated values
BWC
Coverage

Policy
Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.772

.948

.658*

1.189

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.239

.160

.114

.115

.403

.754

.016

.075

p
N = 2797

(c) Panel C: Regression results excluding arrest controls
BWC
Coverage

Policy
Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.813

1.033

.666*

1.137

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.287

.174

.127

.176

.558

.846

.033

.406

p
N = 1833

(d) Panel D: Regression results excluding arrest controls, agencies that never had
BWC
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BWC
Coverage

Policy
Available

Officer Discretion

Footage Misuse

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.769

1.037

.703*

1.287**

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.263

.145

.119

.109

.443

.797

.038

.003

p
N = 2908

(e) Panel E: Regression results without arrest controls and more agencies
All models are estimated using population weights.
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Table 2.4 Body-worn camera roll-out dates, 2010 – 2016
Department
Albuquerque Police Department
Atlanta Police Department
Austin Police Department
Baltimore County Police Department
Baltimore Police Department
Boston Police Department
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
Chicago Police Department
Columbus Police Department
Dallas Police Department
DeKalb County Police Department
Denver Police Department
El Paso Police Department
Fairfax County Police Department
Fort Worth Police Department
Honolulu Police Department
Houston Police Department
Indianapolis Metro Police Department
Kansas City Police Department
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Los Angeles Police Department
Louisville Metro Police Department
Memphis Police Department
Metro Nashville Police Department
Milwaukee Police Department
Philadelphia Police Department
Phoenix Police Department
Portland Police Bureau
Prince George’s County Police Department
San Antonio Police Department
San Diego Police Department
San Francisco Police Department
San Jose Police Department
Seattle Police Department
St. Louis Metro Police Department
Tucson Police Department

Date of roll-out
Aug 2010 (pilot)
May 2012
NA
NA
Jul 2016
Nov 2015 (pilot)
May 2016
Sep 2016 (pilot)
Nov 2013 (pilot)
Sep 2015
Jan 2015 (pilot)
NA
Sep 2015
Jul 2016
Jul 2014
NA
NA
Aug 2012
NA
Apr 2016
NA
Nov 2016
Feb 2014
Sep 2015
Jun 2015
Jul 2016
NA
Nov 2015
Jan 2015
Apr 2013
NA
NA
Mar 2014
Apr 2014
Aug 2016
Jul 2016
NA
NA
Apr 2015
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Figure 2.1 Incidence rate ratios for officer discretion variable when individual
departments dropped from dataset
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PAPER 3. WARRIOR VS. GUARDIAN POLICING CULTURE: THE
EFFECT OF DE-ESCALATION TRAINING ON POLICE USE OF FORCE
Abstract
Despite the widespread interest that de-escalation training has attracted in law
enforcement contexts over the past few years, we know little about its effectiveness in
reducing use of force incidents. This study seeks to ascertain the effect of de-escalation
training on serious use of force events in Camden, a high-crime and high-poverty city in
New Jersey. A difference-in-differences analysis of individual officers suggested deescalation training showed a null effect, whereas a synthetic control analysis of the entire
department suggested that de-escalation training led to a 40% reduction in serious force
events. Spillover effects between trained and untrained officers may account for these
different results.
Introduction
The 2014 shooting of black teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, is often
credited with the beginning of a new era in policing. The incident sparked what Sherman
(2018) terms a ‘Second Great Awakening’ of public awareness and concern over police
violence towards citizens. In addition to the injury and even loss of life entailed, police use
of force has further repercussions. Awareness of such incidents generate negative
community sentiment, which potentially delegitimizes and reduces civilian co-operation
with the police, thereby reducing the efficacy of policing in disadvantaged, majorityminority communities that need it the most. In 2015 and 2016, the Washington Post and
The Guardian (Zimring, 2017) reported that just under 1,000 people were fatally shot by
United States police in each year, over twice the number counted by voluntary federal data.
This number does not include the people who were injured by, but survived, contact with
the police.
The Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) suggested that ‘American policing
is at a critical juncture’, and that there was a need to challenge the conventional thinking
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behind policing as it was currently practiced in the country and to rethink ‘some of the
fundamentals, of policies, training, tactics, and equipment regarding use of force’ (Police
Executive Research Forum, 2016b). What followed were 30 proposed guidelines on use of
force, amongst them that de-escalation should be adopted as formal agency policy. In
addition, PERF stated that police departments must respect the sanctity of human life,
develop best policies that went beyond Graham v. Connor’s—the Supreme Court case
which established an objective reasonableness standard for when an officer can legally use
force—minimum requirements, and meet the test of proportionality in applying use of
force.
De-escalation training can be seen as an incarnation of several police training efforts
to reduce use of force, including conflict resolution techniques such as verbal judo (Meyer
et al., 2009) and less-lethal weapons (MacDonald et al., 2009; Alpert et al., 2011). Deescalation training has been applied in diverse contexts, using different frames and
vocabularies, over the last few decades. Despite such widespread implementation, Engel
et al. (2020) concluded in their systematic review of 64 de-escalation training evaluations
conducted in the past 40 years that almost all the research designs of included studies
scored poorly —a Level 1 or 2 —on the 5-point Maryland Scientific Methods Scale,
demonstrating extremely weak internal validity.
This research complements forthcoming efforts to evaluate de-escalation training
programs (see proposals by Alpert et al. (2016); White & Pooley (2016); Engel et al.
(2019)). While these ongoing studies are randomized control trials conducted within police
departments, this study represents a valuable addition in using a relatively novel method
—synthetic control analysis—to compare outcomes in a department where de-escalation
training was implemented, with other large departments that did not receive such training.
Moreover, it evaluates a high-profile de-escalation program that was credited with reducing
rates of force in Camden, New Jersey (Fiedler, 2016).
The research evaluates the effect of police de-escalation training on levels of use of
force in Camden County, New Jersey. Analysis is conducted on two different levels. In the
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first, a difference-in-differences analysis is applied to a dataset of individual officers and
their use of force, comparing levels of serious force for officers before and after undergoing
de-escalation training, relative to their peers. However, an analysis of individual force rates
may be insufficient, given that individual officers’ behavior is subject to peer influence. A
few recent studies have found that officer involvement in excessive use of force complaints
or misconduct can be explained by exposure to peers accused of similar (Ouellet et al.,
2019; Quispe-Torreblanca & Stewart, 2019); it stands to reason that positive peer influence
may also reduce such behaviors. While this is cause for optimism, it may impede our ability
to evaluate the effect of de-escalation training on an individual level. Therefore, analysis
at a higher level of aggregation —in which the entire department is compared against other
police departments that did not implement de-escalation training —was deemed necessary.
The synthetic control method, in which Camden is compared to a weighted group of other
large police departments in New Jersey which show similar trends in use of force, is
deployed to achieve this. While the difference-in-differences approach did not provide
statistically significant results where individual officers’ use of force levels were concerned,
the synthetic control approach comparing force levels in the department with that of other
departments showed large decreases in force following the intervention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the extant literature
on use of force and de-escalation training, while Section III provides background
information on crime and policing in Camden, as well as the introduction of de-escalation
training in its police department. Section IV provides an overview of the two-part empirical
strategy deployed here. Section V discusses the data used in the analyses. Section VI
provides results from both analyses. Section VII conducts robustness checks, and Section
VIII discusses and concludes.
Literature Review
De-escalation as Successful Authority Maintenance

81

Insofar as there exists a theoretical basis for the concept, the term de-escalation
suggests a conception of potential force encounters as fluid and dynamic situations, in
which social interactions have the potential to spiral out of control. There is a rich vein of
theoretical work on police social interactions and use of force that may explain some of the
factors that determine outcomes in each of these situations. Sykes & Clark’s (1975) theory
of deference exchange was based on Goffman’s (1956; 1961) theory of interaction rituals,
which suggested that individuals in social exchange with one another are governed by
order-creating rituals, and Bittner’s (1967) ethnographic work on policing skid row.
Deference exchange theory suggested that police-citizen encounters are governed by an
asymmetrical status norm in which police officers expect deference from citizens but do
not expect to reciprocate the same level of respect. Arrest and force result from recalcitrant
citizens’ lack of deference and attempts to resist the status definition imposed upon them
by officers.
Binder & Scharf (1980) contributed to deference exchange theory by emphasizing
that the decision to use force was merely an end-point to a contingent sequence of decisions
over four phases: anticipation, entry, information exchange, and the final decision. Alpert
& Dunham’s (2004) authority maintenance theory returned to Sykes & Clark’s 1975
conceptual framework in re-emphasizing the centrality of officers’ authority, in which both
officers and citizens enter encounters with expectations that may range from maintaining
authority and control on the part of officers to being treated fairly or avoiding arrest on the
part of citizens. Alpert & Dunham’s theoretical contribution rests in considering that
citizens, in addition to police, are likely to become more aggressive when their goals are
blocked, thus redefining use of force by either party as the end-result of ‘an escalating
exchange of coercion and resistance’ (Wolfe et al., 2020). In addition, Alpert et al. (2004)
suggest that police interactions with civilians are more likely to involve greater use of force
by the police relative to the suspect when a suspect appears to have less authority relative
to the police officer. These theoretical developments may suggest that officers who are
trained to de-escalate encounters with civilians feel that they are still in control of the
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situation and able to maintain their authority, thereby avoiding that escalation of aggression
that becomes more likely when officer goal blockage occurs.
De-escalation training may therefore reduce force incidents by making officers feel
that they are successfully maintaining their authority, while communicating nonaggressively. Officers’ non-aggressive communication, in turn, is less likely to result in
goal blockage on the part of citizens, thus preventing them from spiraling out of control.
While de-escalation tactics have not been the focus of theoretical explorations in recent
years, researchers have continued to describe the dynamic process underlying policecitizen encounters. Hine et al. (2018) emphasized the need to use a naturalistic decisionmaking approach to understand use of force decisions over shoot-don’t shoot scenarios,
while Wolfe et al. (2020) argued that any research that disregards the fluidity of such
encounters are inherently limited, and training that focuses solely on de-escalation will fail
to capture the complex nature of police citizen-encounters and therefore to effectively
reduce the number of incidents that result in force.
Empirical Evaluations of De-escalation Training
De-escalation training has been applied in diverse contexts, using different frames
and vocabularies, over the last few decades. One of the challenges to studying de-escalation
is that there is no uniformly accepted definition of de-escalation in the field (Oliva et al.,
2010; Todak, 2017; Engel et al., 2020). As such, any definition provided is necessarily
elastic: the National Consensus Policy and Discussion Paper on Use of Force defines deescalation as ‘taking action or communicating verbally or non-verbally during a potential
force encounter in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reduce the immediacy of the
threat so that more time, options, and resources can be called upon to resolve the situation
without the use of force or with a reduction in the force necessary’ (International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2017). Todak (2017) conducted interviews and focus
groups with officers identified by peers as skilled de-escalators, suggesting key elements
of de-escalation: firstly, bringing a situation or citizen in crisis back to an objective or calm
state while secondly, gaining a citizen’s willing cooperation with officer’s instructions, and
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last, achieving both by using the least amount of force possible. Similarly, Oliva et al.’s
(2010) practical overview of the tactic also identified de-escalation as reducing tension
while moving down the National Institute of Justice’s (2009) use of force continuum,
which proceeds, in order of least to most severe, from officer presence, to the verbalization
of commands, empty-hand control, use of hard techniques such as hitting and kicking, to
less-than-lethal methods such as the use of blunt impact, chemical methods and conducted
energy devices, to finally the use of lethal force. The Police Executive Research Forum
(2016b), on the other hand, cautioned against a ‘mechanical’ application of the ‘outdated’
concept. Its concerns were that officers too easily moved up the force continuum in
response to confrontational or aggressive behavior by civilians, instead advocating that
officers be trained to evaluate the ‘entire situation they are facing’.
Despite such widespread implementation, Engel et al. (2020) concluded in their
systematic review of 64 de-escalation training evaluations conducted in the past 40 years
that almost all the research designs of included studies had weak internal validity. Many of
the studies used either pre/post designs or comparison groups without demonstrated
comparability to the treatment groups, or did not use controls within statistical analyses. In
addition, while the studies generally reported positive changes, most reported survey-based
outcomes such as knowledge, confidence, general attitudes, and perceptions of behavior
rather than behavioral measures. Lastly, given that many of the studies were conducted
within the fields of nursing or psychiatry, few evaluated the effect of de-escalation on
outcomes in law enforcement contexts. While there are a number of ongoing randomized
control trials testing the effectiveness of de-escalation training (Alpert et al., 2016; White
& Pooley, 2016; Engel et al., 2019) which will provide higher-quality evidence regarding
the effectiveness of de-escalation within policing contexts, these are still forthcoming.
Given that de-escalation is an important component of the wider Crisis Intervention
Training (CIT) program, the evidence for CIT should also be briefly discussed. CIT is a
mental healthcare model which was developed in Memphis specifically as a strategy for
law enforcement officers to deal with mentally ill individuals in crisis situations (Dupont
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& Cochran, 2000). The CIT model is based on partnerships between law enforcement
agencies, advocacy groups, family members, and individuals with a mental illness.
Typically, specialist officers would undergo a 40-hour training consisting of lectures to
transmit specialized knowledge relating to mental illness, and role-playing interventions
(DuPont et al., 2007; Oliva et al., 2010). In other words, the CIT model was developed for
a particularly vulnerable subset of the population, and envisions de-escalation as a
specialist tool to be used by CIT-trained officers. This contrasts with the kind of deescalation training endorsed by the report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing (2015) and PERF, which recommends that all law enforcement officers be trained
in de-escalation, so that it can be used to gain any citizen’s willing cooperation. Compton
et al. (2008) review 20 studies of CIT, nineteen of which were found in the mental health
literature. Six studies reported on officer-level outcomes, with five studies using survey
designs and one using a focus group methodology. Overall, CIT-trained officers were
likely to report greater knowledge of mental health issues, improved attitudes and
decreased social distance towards subjects with mental illnesses. By and large, patients
brought in by CIT officers were more likely to experience better outcomes, such as
diversion from jails. However, many of the studies were subject to methodological issues,
such as a lack of comparison or control groups. Similarly, Peterson & Densley’s 2018
review of 25 empirical studies on the effect of CIT training on law enforcement agents
identified an overreliance on self-report officer data and a lack of comparison groups and
longitudinal studies. Taheri’s (2016) systematic review and meta-analysis of studies
considering CIT’s effect on law enforcement outcomes required that studies were quasiexperimental or experimental in nature. Only eight studies met the criteria for inclusion,
with six studies measuring the effect of CITs on arrests of individuals with mental illnesses,
suggesting that on average CIT-trained officers were less likely to arrest individuals with
mental illnesses. However, this finding was not unequivocal, with some studies (Acker,
2010; Watson, 2010) showing non-significant effects. Ultimately, the author concluded
that limited conclusions could be drawn from the meta-analysis, given that there have been
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no randomized experiments of CIT and that the type of quasi-experimental setup was found
to significantly affect findings.
In conclusion, there is little evidence either for or against de-escalation training. This
can be attributed to the lack of training evaluations with high-quality research designs, the
lack of behavioral as opposed to attitudinal outcomes measured in such evaluations, and
the fact that many of the studies were conducted within the fields of nursing or psychiatry
as opposed to criminal justice. The state of research on de-escalation as a component of the
wider mental healthcare model found in the Crisis Intervention Training program was
found to be equally lacking, given the limited number of studies available, studies’ reliance
on self-reported outcomes, and lack of comparison groups. The limited state of research
bears out Engel et al. (2020)’s articulation of the ‘urgent need’ for researchers to generate
and disseminate knowledge on de-escalation.
Background
Camden, a city in southern New Jersey, is separated from the city of Philadelphia by
the Delaware River. In 2019, it had a population of 73,000. One of the poorest American
cities, Camden’s record-high murder rate in 2012 ‘rivaled national rates of the most
dangerous countries’ (Maciag, 2014) and was spurred in part by its thriving drug trade,
which in turn resulted in its high rates of opioid-related mortality (Healey et al., 2018).
In 2013, Camden experienced a decisive shift in its policing when the Camden Police
Department was dissolved for several reasons, amongst them a lack of funding, an overpermissive union contract, and endemic corruption within the force (Cornish, 2014;
Zernike, 2012). Camden County Police Department took over policing duties, re-hiring
many of the same officers with a new contract and a new union. Widely viewed as a ‘reset button’, the new department incorporated changes in their style of policing, such as
greater use of foot patrol (Cornish, 2014), better data collection, de-escalation training and
faster response to use of force incidents.2 Since the county takeover of policing in Camden,
2

Personal communication with Lieutenant Kevin Lutz, Camden County Police Department, April 4 2019.
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the city has seen a falling crime rate and, in 2018, a thirty-year low homicide count of 22,
down from 67 in 2012. However, this still gives it the highest homicide rate in New Jersey.
Over a period of nearly two years, CCPD began providing de-escalation training to
its officers. The first training occurred in May 2015, and was provided by a vendor on four
dates in the same year until the company ceased operations and the task of providing deescalation training was taken over by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), which
had developed the ICAT curriculum. Beginning in the last quarter of 2016 and running
throughout 2017, the de-escalation training of existing officers in the force consisted of
initial curriculum training but was also deployed as part of a wider program of response to
use of force, i.e. reinforcement training was provided to officers who had engaged in force
encounters.
ICAT sought to impart the tactical skills that are needed in dynamic situations. The
training comprised a number of modules, including an introduction to the Critical
Decision-Making Model (CDM), crisis recognition and response, tactical communications,
and operational safety tactics, before culminating in several sessions of practice, conducted
via either video case studies or scenario-based exercises. The CDM, which formed the
basis of ICAT training, is a training and operational tool that was adapted from the United
Kingdom’s National Decision Model. It sought to provide officers with a logical thought
process for analyzing and responding to a range of incidents in directing officers to (1)
collect information, (2) assess the situation, threats, and risks, (3) consider police powers
and agency policy, (4) identify options and determine the best course of action, before
finally (5) acting, reviewing, and re-assessing the situation. In developing this model,
PERF noted that similar critical thinking and decision-making processes had been
employed by specialized tactical law enforcement squads to guide their dangerous and
difficult work, and that patrol officers would benefit from a similar model built around an
ethical core encompassing the elements of police ethics, agency values, proportionality,
and the sanctity of human life (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016b).
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The ICAT curriculum introduced a number of new concepts and orientations to
officers that differentiated it from standard supervision and training. First, the CDM sought
to provide officers with a logical thought process for analyzing and responding to incidents
so that they had guidance on the key questions to ask themselves in highly-charged
situations where split-second reactions could be required. Instead of responding in the heat
of the moment and then saying that they did not have time to think, the CDM sought to
provide officers with guidance on what questions to think about. Drawing on concepts
developed from cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), the ICAT training guide suggested
that over time, drawing on the CDM would become learned behavior for officers,
comparable to the automaticity of experienced drivers who did not have to actively think
about their driving (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016a).
Second, ICAT explicitly rejected concepts such as ‘drawing a line in the sand’ or
never backing away from a threat as outdated and unhelpful. Rather, officers were
instructed that by slowing situations down, keeping a safe distance from a threat and using
cover, officers could de-escalate situations peacefully rather than reaching a point at which
lethal force had to be used. This emphasis on non-aggressive communication echoes earlier
discussions of successful police-citizen encounters as meeting officers’ expectations of
authority maintenance on the part of officers —and citizens’ expectations of being treated
with respect. Moreover, the ICAT curriculum explicitly urged agencies to establish clear
expectations that officers take as much time as they needed to handle calls.
Given that ICAT training rejected much of the conventional wisdom in policing, there
was also need to create as much ‘buy-in’ amongst officers as possible. Hence, training was
rolled out innovatively, compared to the regular training academy structure. Instead of
having the program delivered by regular training personnel, the department identified and
recruited twenty informal leaders within the agency, who regardless of rank, assignment,
or experience, were well known and widely respected by fellow officers (Hoban & Gourlie,
2019; Police Executive Research Forum, 2016a). The department provided those personnel
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with train-the-trainer instruction on the philosophy and program. These officers then
delivered the training to the entire department.
In terms of similarities to earlier interventions and practices, the de-escalation training
provided by ICAT was probably the most similar to CIT. However, there are some notable
differences. While departments implementing CIT tended to train only some specialist
officers, ICAT training aimed to transform all officers’ approach to dealing with
individuals in crisis. Moreover, where CIT focused on communications, ICAT identified a
gap between communications and tactical skills. It provided training in the latter so that in
the case where a crisis situation turned dynamic, officers did not resort to the basic
defensive tactics in which they were trained (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016a).
While the first de-escalation training was carried out in May 2015, the first months of
de-escalation training were carried out by the aforementioned first vendor. In total, 71
officers were trained by the first vendor while 432 officers received the ICAT training (a
subset of officers received both first-vendor and ICAT training). Panel D of Table 3.1
provides a more detailed breakdown of the number of officers trained by date. The 71
officers trained by the first vendor were trained on four separate dates, while the PERF
training was provided in 14 sessions over the fifteen months between September 2016 and
December 2017. By the end of 2017, all officers in Camden County Police Department had
been trained.
Empirical Strategy
There are several challenges to providing an empirical analysis of the de-escalation
training program in Camden. These, and the measures taken to address such challenges,
are briefly discussed here. First, the implementation of de-escalation training was not
randomized. In fact, training was first rolled out to officers who were well-respected within
in the department, in order to convince personnel who may otherwise have been skeptical
about the training of its value (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016a). By deploying
officer fixed-effects, the study uses a within estimator to compare changes within a given
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individual between the period prior to training, and the period after training. However,
while using officer fixed-effects in an analysis of individual officers might address
differences in force levels, training receptivity, and general behavior between these officers,
it does not sufficiently address a second challenge, that of spillover effects in behavior. In
this case, non-trained officers may be influenced by others who had undergone the training,
thus adapting their behavior to mimic trained officers and thereby reducing force levels.
Given the relative discreteness of law enforcement agencies (officers affect each others’
behavior within a department; officers in different departments are unlikely to do so), a
department-level analysis comparing Camden County’s levels of force with that of other
departments would address spillovers. However, a simple difference-in-differences
analysis of law enforcement agencies presents its own challenges, given Camden’s outlier
status as a department with high use of force levels and high crime rate. A synthetic control
approach in which a weighted average of outcomes in ‘control’ departments is deployed as
a counterpart to outcomes observed in Camden is therefore used in the department-level
analysis. This section discusses the empirical strategy, and choices made therein, of both
individual-level and department-level analyses of force outcomes.
Officer-level analysis
To evaluate the effect of de-escalation training on serious use of force, we consider
whether individual officers engage in fewer serious force incidents after receiving deescalation training. This is analyzed at the individual officer by month level using the
following simple difference-in-differences equation:
log 𝐸 𝑌&' = 𝛽X + 𝛽+ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇&' + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟&
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ'
The dependent variable Yi t refers to the number of serious use of force incidents that
officer i was involved in during the month t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝐸𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&' is a dummy variable
indicating whether the officer i had received first-vendor de-escalation training during that
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month t and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐴𝑇&' indicates whether the officer i had received PERF-ICAT
training during month t.
This analysis is conditioned on two sets of fixed effects. First, officer fixed effects,
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟& account for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time, but which varies
by officer. This ensures that serious use of force incidents are not being compared between
different officers, but serious force among the months prior to and after de-escalation
training is implemented for a particular officer. Second, the analysis is conditioned on
month fixed effects, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ' . As the crime rate in Camden dropped, it might be that
officers engaged in less force because they were working in an environment that became
safer over time. Month fixed effects accounts for this possibility, as well as other external
factors.
Officer-level data on the number of arrests or crimes responded to, which would
otherwise have served as valuable controls, were not available. Given that officers exposed
to more encounters with citizens are more likely to use force, the lack of information on
such measures impose limitations on the study’s ability to understand if officers who
underwent de-escalation training were also engaging in de-policing.
Serious force incidents are rare. An individual officer engages in an average of .041
incidents every month, which makes the Poisson regression the most suitable method of
analysis for data (MacDonald & Lattimore, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). Further, standard
errors are clustered by officer to account for serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Department-level analysis
The synthetic control method, pioneered by Abadie et al. (2010), is a method of
counterfactual estimation which constructs a synthetic control unit similar to the treatment
unit on observable pre-intervention outcomes. Synthetic controls work best where only
one unit is exposed to the intervention of interest, unlike difference-in-differences studies
where multiple units may receive the intervention at different times. The method has been
used to consider the effect of California’s tobacco control program on tobacco consumption
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(Abadie et al., 2010) and the effect of catastrophic natural disasters on economic growth
(Cavallo et al., 2013); in the area of criminal justice, synthetic controls have been deployed
to evaluate the crime effects of raising the age of majority (Loeffler & Chalfin, 2017),
place-based crime interventions (Saunders et al., 2015) and right-to-carry laws (Donohue
et al., 2017).
In the context of a department-level intervention, a synthetic Camden, composed of a
weighted average of other municipal New Jersey departments that have not implemented
such training, is created for comparison purposes. Each department is assigned an analytic
weight, so that the difference in the pre-intervention outcome between the treated
department (CCPD) and its synthetic control is minimized. The method therefore meets
the assumption of parallel trends prior to the intervention.
The synthetic control provides a supplementary means of exploring the effect of
CCPD’s de-escalation training on serious use of force. Where the difference-in-differences
approach takes individual officers as the unit of analysis, the synthetic control as deployed
in this study considers the department’s force levels in the post-intervention period, with
the outcome that would have been observed had the department not undergone deescalation training.
This is a critical component of the empirical analysis. An analysis that explores the
effect of de-escalation training on individuals, comparing officers who received the
treatment earlier with officers who were treated later, as conducted in the DiD, potentially
neglects the behavioral peer effects of de-escalation training on the latter. Officers that
received de-escalation training may affect the behavior of officers who had not yet been
trained, reducing the latter’s force rates. A comparable case is provided in Miguel &
Kremer (2004) study of school-based mass deworming treatment in rural Kenya, in which
it was found that deworming reduced worm burdens not only in schools which received
the treatment, but also had similar effects among children in neighboring primary schools.
Within the policing context, spillovers have been detected in body-worn camera RCTs.
Repeated exposure changed officers’ behavior even when they are not assigned to the
92

treatment condition (Ariel et al., 2017, 2019), leading Ariel et al. (2017) to dub the
phenomenon ‘contagious accountability’.
As discussed earlier, Camden has much higher levels of serious use of force than other
municipalities in New Jersey. This study employs Doudchenko & Imbens (2016)’s
(henceforth referred to as DI) adaptation of Abadie, Diamond, & Hainmueller (2010)
(ADH)’s synthetic control procedure. The ADH synthetic control procedure involves a
number of restrictions that DI proceed to relax. This section discusses DI’s synthetic
control procedure, beginning with a brief overview of notation used and the basic synthetic
control method. This is followed by the mo tivation behind ADH’s restrictions, as well as
DI’s relaxation of those restrictions. Finally, we discuss the regularization methods DI
employ to deal with a potentially large number of possible control units.
The synthetic control method creates a counterpart unit that closely matches outcomes
which comprises a weighted average of control units; if conventional regression equally
weights all control units, the synthetic control seeks weights that cause the control to most
closely simulate the treatment unit. Notation-wise, we consider that there are N + 1 crosssectional units, in this case departments. Units i = 1, …, N are control units which do not
receive the treatment in any time period. Unit N + 1 receives the control treatment in
periods 1, . . . 𝑇Z and the active treatment in time periods 𝑡 = 𝑇Z + 1, … , 𝑇Z +𝑇+ . We are
interested in the treatment effect for the unit that receives the treatment during the postintervention time period, or 𝑌& 𝑡 1 − 𝑌& 𝑡(0).
The equation in full is:
c
ZdB
𝜔& ∙ 𝑌&,_

𝑌Z,_ 0 = 𝜇 +
&C+

The imputed control outcome for the treated unit is a linear combination of the control
units, with an intercept of 𝜇 and weights 𝜔& for the control unit i. In order to address
Camden’s status as an outlier, the study employs DI’s adaptation of the ADH synthetic
control procedure, which includes an intercept and relaxes the requirement that weights
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must sum to one. These changes accommodate a situation in which the treatment unit
produces outcomes that are systematically larger than that of the control units, as is the
case here. DI additionally introduce a third change in which weights can be negative, to
allow for negative correlation between treatment and control units. However, this is not
applied here. Due to the relative discreteness of law enforcement agencies, any negative
correlation between outcomes (Camden’s force levels decreasing while, for example,
Newark’s increases) is likely to be spurious.
Given the relaxation of ADH restrictions, the recurrent problem is then that there are
a large number of potential combinations of weights, leading to a lack of precision in the
estimator. DI regularize this through an elastic-net type penalty (Hastie et al. 2009; 2015)
that combines ridge regression and the lasso penalty.
Data
Officer-level analysis
Using administrative data obtained from CCPD, a monthly panel dataset of 432
officers was constructed for the difference-in-differences analysis. The dataset contained
monthly data beginning January 2014 and ending in May 2019 (65 months). Training
began in May 2015, with the last officers in the dataset receiving training in December
2017. As officers were hired at different times and some of them had left prior to the last
month included, the panel dataset was unbalanced.
Dependent variable: The dependent variable consists of serious use of force incidents.
Within the data, use of force incidents were categorized accordingly, from least serious to
most: (1) compliance hold, (2) takedown, (3) use of hands/fists, (4) use of feet/kicking, (5)
use of pepper spray, (6) use of baton, (7) use of canine, (8) use of conducted energy device,
and (9) firearm discharge. Serious use of force incidents were defined as force incidents in
which any force more serious than that of a takedown was employed.
Serious use of force incidents are defined as such and deployed as the variable of
interest for a number of reasons. First, serious force is arguably a more important outcome
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than all force incidents: while use of force should be avoided where possible, incidents in
which serious use of force is employed by definition carry a heavier risk of injury and loss
of human life. Secondly, as a measure it is also arguably more sensitive to changes in police
training regimens: while an officer might still find it necessary to physically restrain a
civilian during the course of their duties, de-escalation training if effective would influence
them to use less severe forms of force than previously. Third, this study uses a relatively
broad definition of serious force. A more stringent definition would restrict serious force
incidents to only incidents which involved firearm discharge, or the use of firearms and
CEDs. As an example, a well-known incident in which de-escalation successfully took
place in Camden ended shortly after one of the officers involved fired his Taser (Leahy,
2016). Although that outcome would still be considered serious force by this measure, it
was viewed as a successful outcome and a ‘validation’ of de-escalation techniques (Fiedler,
2016). The reason that a more stringent definition of serious force could not be employed
was that serious force incidents were relatively rare, and incidents in which firearms are
used, the most harmful and life-threatening form of force, were extremely rare. While the
dataset counted 1766 use-of-force incidents of any level and 775 serious use-of-force
incidents, there were just 7 incidents involving a firearm. Therefore, firearm incidents were
not considered a suitable outcome measure.
Independent variable: Each officer’s training status was expressed in two dummy
variables indicating whether the officer in question had previously undergone either deescalation training or PERF-ICAT training. There were 18 unique dates in which officers
underwent either de-escalation or PERF-ICAT trainings. While only 71 officers underwent
de-escalation training, all 432 officers included in the dataset underwent PERF-ICAT
training.
Department-level analysis
Data for the department-level analysis consisted of administrative data from the police
departments of the 36 largest municipalities in New Jersey. This data was obtained from
The Force Report, a centralized database published by NJ Advance Media, which acquired
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the data via public records requests to all police departments in New Jersey. The data were
input and cleaned by a third-party company, then audited and standardized by NJ Advance
Media staff. The incident-level database contains information on the dates, times, type of
force used in each incident, the race and age of each subject, and the name of each officer
(NJ Advance Media, 2019).
This data was compiled into a department-by-quarter dataset. The synthetic control
analysis employs quarterly use of force data from departments with jurisdiction over 35
out of 36 of the largest municipalities in New Jersey.3 Camden is the twelfth most populous
municipality in New Jersey, and all the municipalities included in the dataset had a
population of at least 50,000 at the beginning of the study period. Beginning the first
quarter of 2012 and ending the last quarter of 2016, the balanced panel dataset consists of
35 departments x 20 quarters = 700 rows.
Dependent variable: The dependent variable was the rate of serious use of force
incidents per 1,000 arrests each quarter. As with the officer-level analysis, serious force
incidents were any events in which any force more serious than that of a takedown was
employed.
Independent variable: Despite the presence of multiple training dates, the date of
intervention is taken as the date on which the first officer was trained (May 2, 2015). As
only 17 officers were trained on the date, this provides us with a somewhat conservative
estimate.
Following the county takeover of policing in Camden and prior to the implementation
of de-escalation training, CCPD had already incorporated changes such as improved
collection of data, particularly pertaining to use of force. This would also make the
estimated effect more conservative, given that we expect more serious force incidents to
be recorded after the dissolution of Camden Police Department (CPD) in Q5 compared

3

As there were too many zero values reported by Parsippany, it had to be removed from the dataset.
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with the number of incidents recorded during the CPD regime of Q1-4, including during
the post-intervention period of Q14-20.
Results
Officer-level analysis
Descriptive characteristics
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive characteristics of the Camden officer-month panel
dataset. Panel A of that table provides overall statistics. Use of force incidents were
relatively rare, with .092 incidents occurring per officer and month. Serious use of force
incidents were even rarer, with an average of .042 incidents. Incidents involving firearms
were rarest of all, at .00004 incidents per officer and month. 15.7% of officer-by-month
rows were given de-escalation training by the first vendor, while 51.7% of officer-bymonth rows were provided with PERF’s ICAT training. Panels B and C disaggregate
officers by whether, and when, they received de-escalation training from the first vendor
and PERF respectively. The first column of Panel B provides the mean on key measures
of force (all use of force incidents, serious use of force incidents, and incidents involving
firearm use) for the group that underwent training by the first vendor, while the second and
third columns disaggregate those figures into the pre-training mean and the post-training
mean. Compared to the untrained group, the group that was trained engaged in more use
of force, more serious use of force, and more force incidents involving firearms, throughout
the study period. Following the implementation of de-escalation training, use of force
amongst the group of trained officers seemed to decrease: use of force incidents fell from
a mean of .158 to .071, serious use of force incidents fell from .080 to .033, and the mean
of incidents involving a firearm fell from .002 to .0003.
All officers in the dataset underwent ICAT training. However, a comparison group
was iteratively constructed based on officers who had not been trained during each training
date (e.g. if an officer received ICAT training in 2017, during the month of September
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2016, when ICAT trainings were first rolled out, they would be considered a member of
the untrained group).
Panel C of Table 3.1 compares pre-ICAT means of force with post-ICAT means of
force amongst the treated and comparison groups. Similarly to the first vendor’s deescalation training, following ICAT training force seemed to decrease for the treated group:
from .126 to .063 for use of force incidents, from .054 to .029 for serious force incidents,
and from .0005 to .0003 for incidents involving a firearm. However, the comparison group
saw post-training decreases in force as well, albeit ones that were smaller. The only
exception was the firearm incident variable, where the comparison group saw a decrease
from .0006 in the pre-treatment period to 0 in the post. However, given how rare the
outcome was, that difference should be treated as negligible.
Figure 3.1 presents the rollout of training, with the cumulative number of officers
trained during each month. These exact training dates are presented in Table 3.11. Figure
3.2 presents the mean number of use of force incidents each officer engaged in each month
within a 24-month period: 12 months prior to training, and 12 months after training.
Strictly speaking, there is no ‘control’ group as all officers in the dataset were trained
by the end of the study period. However, the graph presents as a control group the 109
officers who were trained from March 2017 onwards, and takes the 24-month period prior
to training as the appropriate observation window. The incidence of use of force does not
seem sufficiently dense to present meaningful trends —as the serious force variable was
even sparser, it was not presented in the figure. However, Figure 3.2 does suggest that
trends in use of force between the two groups of officers were not wildly divergent prior
to the implementation of training.
Main results
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis are presented in Table 3.3. The
result of PERF’s ICAT training is presented in the column on the left, which shows an
Incident Rate Ratio (IRR) of 1.294. While this would suggest that ICAT training actually
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resulted in an increase of serious force levels by 29.4%, the standard error and p-value
of .291 and .251 respectively are too large for the result to be considered significant.
Similarly, the IRR for the other de-escalation training program is 1.05, but is insignificant.
On an individual officer level, it seems that neither type of training show significant
changes in serious use of force levels.
Event study
The event study exploits the fact that de-escalation training was rolled out over a
period of time. Essentially, officers which underwent training the same number of months
ago are treated as equivalent to each other, even if they were trained on different dates i.e.
an officer trained in the month of September 2016 is, in December 2016, the same position
as an officer trained in December 2016 is in March 2016.
The equation for analysis is:
+6

𝛽 B 𝐼 𝐷&'B = 1 + 𝛾& + 𝜔'

log 𝑌&' = 𝛼 +
BCD+6

𝐷 B represents the event dummies, which are equal to one when officer i was trained
in de-escalation s months ago as of year t. The analysis is performed using serious force
incidents within twelve months (before and after) of training for each officer, with standard
errors being clustered at officer level. As with the main analysis, officer and month fixed
effects are employed. By conducting an event study, one can evaluate both whether there
are force trends prior to training, and how levels of force change, on a monthly basis, after
the intervention. (Note: s=-1 or the month prior to implementation is the reference year,
and as such was excluded from the regression.)
Figure 3.3 plots the coefficients and their confidence intervals following the Poisson
regression of serious use of force incidents on event dummies. The horizontal axis
represents the dummy variables for the number of years prior to and after DOJ intervention.
The vertical axis represents the IRR for the dummy variables, with IRR = 1 indicating no
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change. The dot marks the point estimates and the error bars represent the 95% confidence
intervals. With the single exception of T = 5, the bars suggest that there are no marked preand post-treatment trends, given that the error bars on each of the dummy variables range
across IRR = 1. T = 5 suggests an increase in serious force five months after each officer
is trained. Together, the event study suggests no marked pre- or post-treatment trends.
Department-level analysis
Descriptive characteristics
In Table 3.2, the summary statistics for the New Jersey department-quarter panel
dataset used in the synthetic control analysis are presented. Out of the 35 law enforcement
agencies in New Jersey included in the dataset, a mean of 22.85 use of force incidents
occurred every month.
Fewer than half (10.09) were serious force incidents, while incidents involving a
firearm were extremely rare —.229 per department per month. The statistics are also
standardized by arrest since arrest can be a proxy for the amount of contact between officers
and civilians, which can vary by jurisdiction and affect the likelihood of a force encounter.
Panel B disaggregates these figures into departments which received the de-escalation
intervention, and departments that did not. Since Camden was the only department to
implement de-escalation training during the study period, its force statistics are provided
in Column 1. Columns 2 and 3 disaggregate the figures presented in Column 1 to the preintervention period (Q1 to Q13, prior to the date of first training in Q14) and the postintervention period (Q14 onwards). Columns 4-6 present use of force figures for
departments other than Camden.
Overall, Camden officers engaged in more use of force than officers in other New
Jersey Departments. For all use of force incidents, the mean was 90.95, compared with
20.26 in other departments. For serious force incidents, this was 37.5 compared with the
mean of 9.02 of other departments. For incidents involving a firearm, on average Camden
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officers engaged in .90 incidents per quarter compared with .20 for officers from other
departments.
There was a clear drop in use of force after the intervention took place. For the
quarters preceding the implementation of de-escalation training, an average of 99.6 use of
force incidents occurred every quarter. After the intervention, the average fell to 74.9.
There was an even greater reduction in serious force incidents, from 47.8 to 18.3. The
difference was marked even when these numbers were standardized by arrest, suggesting
that use of force did not fall simply because officers made fewer arrests or initiated fewer
encounters. Other New Jersey departments marked no such reductions.
Figure 3.4 presents the number of serious force incidents per 1,000 arrests in a
quarterly graph. The line in red represents serious force incidents for Camden throughout
the study period, whereas the line in blue represents an unweighted average of the other
New Jersey departments included in the dataset. There is an intercept at Q5 to reflect the
date at which Camden Police Department was dissolved and Camden County Police
Department took over law enforcement duties in Camden (first quarter of 2013), and an
intercept at Q13 to show the last period prior to intervention (first quarter of 2015). The
figure shows that Camden had a much higher rate of serious force than the rest of New
Jersey until the intervention began, when it fell beneath the New Jersey average.
Figure 3.5 shows the rate of serious force per 1,000 arrests respectively for Camden
and the five largest municipalities in New Jersey: Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Elizabeth,
and Edison. (Camden is the twelfth largest municipality in New Jersey, with a population
of 73,000.) There, the incidence and rates of force are more comparable to that of Camden’s,
although the trends seem markedly different.
Figure 3.6 shows a graph of Camden’s force incidents broken down by force level.
As with Figures 3.3 and 3.4, there is an intercept at Q5 to reflect the county’s takeover of
policing duties and an intercept at Q13 to show the last period prior to intervention (first
quarter of 2015). The figure shows that compliance holds, the least severe form of force,
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were also the most commonly used. Additionally, they accounted for much of the postintervention decline in total force. The use of hands (for punching), or the least severe form
of force still considered ‘serious force’, were the most commonly used form of serious
force. Out of the forms of force considered serious, hands and legs accounted for most of
the post-Q13 decline in total serious force, while other forms of serious force such as
pepper spray, use of batons, and other weapons (comprising canines, stun weapons, and
guns), were too rare to account for much of this decline.
Main results
Table 3.4 displays the weights of each control municipality in the synthetic Camden.
The weights reported indicate that serious use of force trends in Camden, New Jersey prior
to the introduction of de-escalation training is best reproduced by a combination of ten
municipalities (Edison, Middletown, Old Bridge, Bayonne, Union Township, Piscataway,
Irvington, Howell, Hoboken, and West New York). All other municipalities in the donor
pool are assigned zero weights. As discussed in the Methods section, the DI synthetic
control method used in this study rejects the ADH restriction that weights must be less than
one or sum to one, since it is implausible if the outcome for the treatment unit is
systematically larger than that in the control units.
Figure 3.7 displays serious use of force rates for Camden and its synthetic counterpart
during the period 2012-2016. It is to be noted that, in contrast to the unweighted New
Jersey average shown in Figure 3.4, serious force levels in synthetic Camden closely track
those in ‘real’ Camden throughout the entire pre-intervention period. Following the
introduction of de-escalation training, however, outcomes diverge with synthetic
Camden’s outcomes. The real Camden experienced a marked decline compared to serious
force rates exhibited by its synthetic counterpart. The discrepancy between those two lines
suggest that de-escalation training had a large negative effect on serious uses of force.
Figure 3.8 plots the quarterly estimates of the impacts of de-escalation, that is, gaps
in serious use of force incidents, between synthetic Camden and the real city. The figure
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suggests that de-escalation had a large and sustained effect on serious force. Across the
post-intervention period, the number of serious force incidents dropped by an average of
50 incidents per 1,000 arrests each quarter, a decline of approximately 40%.
Crime as a dependent variable
While most would agree that reducing serious use of force is a desirable goal,
concerns have been raised that training police officers to de-escalate situations rather than
engaging in force will increase crime rates if it causes the environment that police officers
operate in to become more dangerous, thereby causing police officers to withdraw from
proactively enforcing the law. Similar discussions have been raised with respect to a
purported Ferguson effect, in which increased scrutiny of the police ostensibly causes depolicing due to fear of negative attention over racial profiling or use of force. The evidence
for such an effect is mixed (Rosenfeld, 2015; Pyrooz et al., 2016; Shjarback et al., 2017).
However, if increased crime is a consequence of de-escalation training, this is necessarily
a trade-off that policymakers should weigh in considering whether to implement deescalation training more widely.
To ascertain this relationship, the synthetic control analysis was re-run, this time using
the violent crime rate as the outcome of interest. The results are presented in Figure 3.8.
The violent crime rate that occurred in post-intervention Camden did not diverge
significantly from that presented by its synthetic counterpart. Moreover, the figure shows
that a drop in violent crime in Camden did occur from Q7 onwards, suggesting that a fall
in the crime rate could have contributed to declining force levels prior to the
implementation of de-escalation training. Weights are presented in Table 3.6.4
Robustness checks
Officer-level analysis: Counts of force weighted by seriousness

4

The weights in this analysis, as well as those for the analyses run to perform checks on the robustness of
results, were different from the weights used to create the synthetic control in the main analysis, as the
estimator was optimizing for a match in a different outcome.
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As an alternative to using serious force incidents as the dependent variable, all use of
force incidents were weighted by seriousness and added up to produce an aggregate
measure. The least severe form of force, compliance holds, were assigned one point, while
the next least severe form of force, takedowns, were assigned two points, etc., with the
most severe form of force (firearm use) being assigned nine points. Despite the inclusion
of all forms of force in the measure, a positive value for the weighted measure continued
to be a rare occurrence. Therefore, a Poisson regression was applied, as in the main analysis.
Results for the analysis are presented in Table 3.5. The results are slightly different
from that of the main analysis. The result of PERF’s ICAT training is presented in the
column on the left, which shows an IRR of .915. This suggests that the training reduced
force by 8.5%; however, the results are not significant. The IRR for the other de-escalation
training program is 1.088, suggesting that it resulted in an increase in force by 8.8%, but
that is also not significant.
Department-level analysis: difference-in-differences
A difference-in-differences analysis was applied to the department-quarter panel
dataset that was originally used in the synthetic control analysis. A difference-indifferences analysis is analogous to a synthetic control analysis in which the control
municipalities are all equally weighted (Doudchenko & Imbens, 2016). However, this
difference-in-differences approach differs from the synthetic control employed in the main
analysis in its adoption of demographic control variables, with an equation as follows:
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌&' ) = 𝛽X + 𝛽+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔&' + 𝛽6 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒&' + 𝛽; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘&'
+ 𝛽> 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛&' + 𝛽A 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃&' + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦& + 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟'
Where 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌&' ) refers to the force outcome, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔&' is a binary variable where
Camden County was assigned a value from Q14 onwards. Camden prior to Q14 and all
other departments in all time periods, not having received the de-escalation training, were
assigned a 0. 𝑉𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒&' is a control variable for the lagged violent crime rate (the rate
from the prior quarter), 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘&' controls for racial demographics in denoting the
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percentage of the population that is Black, 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑛&' is another control variable
reflecting the percentage of the population that was not born in the United States, and
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃&' is a measure of poverty in denoting the percentage of the population on
SNAP benefits. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦& and 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟' are agency and quarter fixed effects respectively.
As with the individual-level difference-in-differences analysis, serious force incidents are
rare even at the department-quarter dataset, leading to small counts. This made a Poisson
model the most suitable to apply here (MacDonald & Lattimore, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010),
with standard errors clustered by agency to account for serial correlation (Bertrand et al.,
2004).
Table 3.6 presents the results of the difference-in-differences analysis. De-escalation
training had a negative and significant effect on serious use of force, with an IRR of .426
suggesting that serious force was more than halved i.e. the effect was even larger than that
suggested by the synthetic control analysis, which indicated a 40% reduction. The results
also indicated that the proportion of a population that was Black had a positive and
significant effect on the number of serious use of force incidents that community was likely
to experience: an IRR of 1.049 suggested that for every percentage point increase in the
percentage of the population that was Black, a 4.9% increase in serious force incidents
would result. None of the other control variables were significant.
Department-level analysis: Testing for anticipation effects
It is plausible that individual officers began changing their behavior prior to the
implementation of de-escalation training, in response to expectations that they would be
undergo it in the future. Anticipation effects usually cause treatment effects to be
underestimated, because the before-after comparison attributes anticipatory treatment
effects to the before period, and thereby ‘not only ignores, but deducts, anticipatory
treatment effects from the overall treatment effect’ (Malani & Reif, 2015).
Despite the fact that anticipation effects, if any exist, would provide conservative
estimates, this check re-ran synthetic controls counting Q13 as the quarter the treatment
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began to subsume any anticipation, one quarter earlier than the timing of the actual
treatment.
Figure 3.10 presents the results for analysis. Trends for Camden’s synthetic
counterpart largely resemble that of the main analysis, with the exception that outcomes
for real and synthetic Camden are seen to diverge earlier. A possible explanation is that the
decline in use of force should be attributed not to the implementation of de-escalation
training, but to the county’s takeover of policing, which began much earlier in Q5. Weights
of synthetic Camden for this analysis are reported in Table 3.8.
Department-level analysis: All force incident outcomes
As noted earlier, only serious force incidents were deployed as the outcome in the
main analysis. The reason for this is that de-escalation training by definition aims to
influence officers to use less severe forms of force than previously, whereas avoiding any
force whatsoever, even takedowns or compliance holds, may not be possible during the
course of officers’ duties. Despite the fact that deploying serious use of force as an outcome
arguably possesses more external validity than considering all force incidents, including
low-level ones, it might be that officers in Camden County continued to routinely deploy
low-level uses of force against civilians even as de-escalation training resulted in a
decrease in the most serious and rare forms of use of force. Further, the measure of all force
incidents is certainly denser, making it easier for the synthetic control to track outcome
trends measured in Camden. Therefore, this check consisted of running a synthetic control
analysis in which the outcome measure was all force incidents. The results of the analysis
are presented in Figure 3.11. The first point to note is that the outcome is much denser —
CCPD reported between 50 and 150 force incidents in every quarter, and standardized by
arrest this provided an average of around 200 use of force incidents per thousand arrests.
The second issue is that the divergence between outcomes for real and ‘synthetic’ Camden
is even more striking than when the outcome comprised only serious force incidents, with
a decrease of 63.5%. Weights are reported in Table 3.9.
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Department-level analysis: More serious force incident outcomes
Despite the restriction of the outcome to serious force events only in the main analysis,
a relatively loose definition of ‘serious’ force was employed, consisting of any incident in
which force more serious than a takedown was employed. As one proceeds up the force
spectrum, incidents involving more serious forms of force become increasingly rare, which
makes it difficult to estimate overall trends using weighted averages of the control units.
This robustness check uses a more stringent definition of serious force, including any form
of force in which firearm and non-firearm weapons are used, specifically batons, canines,
conducted energy devices, and firearms. It excludes force incidents in which officers used
their hands or fists, or legs or feet, as were included in the original analysis.
Figure 3.12 presents the results of this analysis. Outcomes in real Camden decreased
by approximately 68% compared with its synthetic counterpart. Weights are reported in
Table 3.10.
Department-level analysis: Placebo tests for randomization inference
There is a possibility that the results showing Camden’s dramatic decrease in serious
force incidents following the implementation of de-escalation training could be driven
entirely by chance. In order to test this hypothesis, a placebo test is employed by applying
the synthetic control method to every control unit in the dataset, as with Abadie &
Gardeazabal (2003); Bertrand et al. (2004); Abadie et al. (2010). In effect, each New Jersey
municipality in the dataset that did not train its officers in de-escalation during the study
period is treated as if it had implemented the training beginning Q14. In each iteration, the
study assigns ‘treatment’ to one of the 34 control municipalities, shifting Camden to the
donor pool. The estimated effect associated with each placebo run is then computed.
If the placebo studies create gaps for the difference in real and synthetic outcomes, of
magnitude similar to that shown in the main results, then the analysis would suggest there
is no significant evidence that de-escalation training reduced serious force in Camden.
However, if the placebo studies show that the gap estimated for Camden is unusually large
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relative to the gaps for the municipalities that did not implement de-escalation training,
then the analysis would provide signicant evidence of a negative effect of de-escalation
training on serious force.
Figure 3.13 displays the results for the placebo test. The grey lines represent the gap
associated with each of the 34 iterations of the test, or the difference in serious use of force
between each municipality in the donor pool and its respective synthetic counterpart. The
superimposed black line denotes the gap estimated for Camden. The estimated postintervention gap for Camden during the 2012-2016 period is not large compared to that for
some of the placebo effects. However, some of the large post-intervention gaps may be
from iterations of the placebo test which also produced large pre-intervention gaps,
indicating a poor fit overall.
To calculate the extent to which the synthetic control analysis tracks with actual force
outcomes, the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) is a useful measure. The mean
squared prediction error takes the difference between the number of serious force incidents
predicted by the synthetic control and the number of serious force incidents that actually
occurred in each quarter, squares the figure to eradicate differences in sign, and then takes
the mean. The square root of this number is then calculated to indicate how far off, on
average, the synthetic control analysis was, from the actual reported outcome. A small
RSMPE in the pre-period would indicate that the synthetic control is a good fit, whereas a
large RSMPE in the pre-period would indicate a poor fit. In the main analysis, the preperiod RSMPE in the Camden synthetic control analysis was 10.35 and the post-period
RSMPE was 136.46. This indicates that in the pre-period, the synthetic Camden tracked its
real counterpart fairly closely, and was ‘off’ by an average of 10.35 serious force incidents
per 1,000 arrests each quarter. In the post-period, outcomes for Camden and its synthetic
counterpart diverged by an average of 136.46 serious force incidents per 1,000 arrests each
quarter.
Compared with other municipalities included in the dataset, the RMSPE for the
Camden synthetic control in the pre-period was about average —the pre-period RMSPE
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for all municipalities had a mean of 13.2, and the largest RMSPE reported was 31.4
(Elizabeth). Municipalities which show a high RMSPE during the pre-period do not
provide useful information about the relative rarity of estimating a large post-period gap
for a municipality that was well-fitted prior to the intervention. Therefore, placebo tests
that resulted in a pre-intervention RMSPE of over 20, nearly twice that of Camden’s, were
removed from the pool. This comprised the placebos for five municipalities: Elizabeth,
Hoboken, Jackson, Passaic, and Perth Amboy. The analysis is then presented in Figure
3.14. Camden now has one of the largest post-intervention gaps out of 30 municipalities,
but still not the largest. Ultimately, given that the pool is limited to 30 municipalities, the
placebo test is underpowered. However, the findings suggest it has the third-largest postintervention gap.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite the widespread discussion and implementation of de-escalation training in
law enforcement contexts throughout the United States, empirical verification of such
programs remain forthcoming. The present study examined, using both an individual-level
and a department-level analysis, whether de-escalation training resulted in fewer serious
use of force incidents. The study found that while the former revealed no significant effects
of de-escalation training, the latter suggested that serious force incidents fell by nearly half
following the intervention.
A possible mechanism is the presence of huge spillover effects within CCPD, which
are not available between law enforcement agencies in different New Jersey municipalities.
A similar effect has been detected in body-worn camera RCTs (Ariel et al., 2017, 2019),
in which repeated exposure to the technology changed officers’ behavior even when they
were not assigned to the treatment condition. This effect has implications for how future
experiments should be designed to account for precisely such a phenomenon.
In addition to the large decreases in serious use of force and total force, the study also
found that there were no significant increases in the violent crime rate following the
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intervention. This may be reassuring to policymakers weighing potential trade-offs
between decreased use of force and an increased crime rate. Future research should assess
the effect of de-escalation trainings on adjacent outcomes, such as officer injury, excessive
force complaints, and arrests.
The perceived limitations of this study will be briefly discussed. First, the deescalation training was not implemented on a treatment-control group basis, requiring the
use of a difference-in-differences methodology. Second, officer-level information on
arrests or stops, which would have served as valuable controls, were not available. This
analysis yielded no significant results, suggesting either the ineffectiveness of deescalation training or peer influence of non-trained officers by officers who had undergone
the training. In order to test for this, a synthetic control analysis was used to compare
CCPD’s serious force levels as a whole with other municipal law enforcement agencies in
New Jersey. This brings us to the third limitation of the study. Given that Camden is an
outlier in crime levels, demographic factors, and serious force levels, it was hard to find a
synthetic control unit that provided a good match for the city. In order to address this,
Doudchenko & Imbens’s (2016) adaptation of the original Abadie et al. (2010) or ADH
synthetic control method was used to relax some of the restrictions that resulted in a poor
fit. However, this choice meant that only pre-period trends of the outcome measure were
used as the basis of matching, rather than taking into account potential control factors such
as crime levels and demographics, as ADH do. Checks on the robustness of these results
were somewhat mixed. While a placebo test suggested that the post-intervention gap
between Camden and its synthetic counterpart was large, other municipalities that did not
implement de-escalation training for their police force showed comparably large post‘intervention’ gaps as well. On the other hand, a difference-in-differences analysis of the
department-by-quarter panel dataset used in the synthetic control analysis corroborated the
initial finding that de-escalation training resulted in a large decrease in serious force
incidents. Fourth, the reform-oriented environment created by the dissolution of Camden
Police Department and the county takeover of policing services means we cannot exclude
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the possibility of other changes having more effect on serious force than de-escalation itself.
After 2013, Camden County Police Department implemented several changes, such as the
collection of detailed force data, that related to how policing was carried out in Camden.
On the other hand, this study seeks to evaluate an intervention that started in the second
quarter of 2015, well after the county takeover of policing services and the initial
implementation of reforms. If anything, the unique policing context of Camden may well
pose an external validity challenge, in that it may be difficult to replicate the environment
in which the training took place.
Within the criminological literature on police use of force, this study is one of the first
to apply the synthetic control method. While a difference-in-differences analysis of
individual officers showed no significant effects on serious force levels following deescalation training, a synthetic control analysis comparing serious force levels in Camden
County Police Department with police departments in other large New Jersey
municipalities showed a large negative effect. Following the implementation of deescalation training, serious use of force declined by approximately 40%.
The amount of resistance that greeted PERF’s 2016 recommendation to adopt deescalation as formal agency policy suggests challenges remain for the prospect in the
contemporary policing climate. However, this study offers evidence that if successfully
implemented, de-escalation training may reap large benefits in reducing human injury and
enhancing police legitimacy, even in an extremely challenging policing environment.
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Paper 3 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1 Summary statistics of Camden officer-month panel dataset
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min.

Max.

UOF incidents

.092

.334

0

4

Serious UOF incidents

.041

.215

0

4

Incidents involving a firearm

.0004

.019

0

1

De-escalation training

.157

.364

0

1

PERF-ICAT training

.517

.500

0

1

(a) Panel A: Descriptive characteristics
Variable

Trained Group
Mean

Pre-training
Mean

Post-training
Mean

Untrained
Group mean

.100

.158

.071

.090

UOF incidents

Serious UOF
.049
.080
.033
.038
incidents
Incidents involving a
.0009
.0020
.0003
.0002
firearm
(b) Panel B: Descriptive characteristics in pre- and post-de-escalation training
periods
Variable

Pre-ICAT
Treated

Post-ICAT
Treated

Pre-ICAT
Comparison

Post-ICAT
Comparison

UOF incidents

.127

.063

.127

.094

Serious UOF incidents

.054

.029

.056

.047

Incidents involving a firearm

.0005

.0003

.0006

0

(c) Panel C: Descriptive characteristics in pre- and post-ICAT periods

112

Table 3.2 Summary statistics of New Jersey department-quarter panel dataset
Variable

Mean

S.D.

Min.

Max.

UOF incidents

22.85

21.52

0

150

Serious UOF incidents

10.09

11.89

0

72

Incidents involving a firearm

.229

.643

0

6

UOF per 1,000 arrests

145

91.2

0

727

Serious UOF per 1,000 arrests

58

47.7

0

364

Firearm incidents per 1,000 arrests

1.25

4.17

0

45

(a) Panel A: Descriptive characteristics
Variable

Camden

PreIntervention
Camden

PostIntervention
Camden

Other
departments

Other
departments
Preintervention

Other
departments
Postintervention

UOF
incidents

90.95

99.62

74.9

20.26

20.20

20.37

37.5

47.84

18.3

9.02

9.46

8.20

.9

1.15

.43

.20

.22

.18

UOF per
1,000 arrests

208

245

142

139

135

149

Serious UOF
per 1,000
arrests

92.1

123

34

56.19

58.5

51.9

Firearm
incidents per
1,000 arrests

2.25

2.94

.97

1.18

1.10

1.34

Serious UOF
incidents
Incidents
involving a
firearm

(b) Panel B: Descriptive characteristics of Camden vs. other departments
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Table 3.3 Difference-in-differences
PERF-ICAT training

De-escalation training

1.294

1.050

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.291

.211

p

.251

.808

[.833, 2.011]

[.708, 1.557]

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

[CI]
Observations = 19134
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Table 3.4 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden
Municipality

Weight Municipality

Weight

Newark

0 Gloucester Township

0

Jersey City

0 East Orange

0

Paterson

0 Bayonne

.094

Elizabeth

0 Franklin

0

Edison

.134 North Bergen

0

Woodbridge

0 Vineland

0

Lakewood

0 Union Township

Tom’s River

0 Piscataway

Hamilton

0 New Brunswick

0

Trenton

0 Jackson

0

Clifton

0 Wayne

0

Brick

0 Irvington

.079

Cherry Hill

0 Howell

.071

Passaic

0 Perth Amboy

Middletown
Union City
Old Bridge

.465
1.249

0

.306 Hoboken

.114

0 Plainfield

0

.426 West New York

.150
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Table 3.5 Difference-in-differences using weighted measure
PERF-ICAT training

De-escalation training

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)

.915

1.088

𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

.165

.141

p

.608

.530

[.906, 1.307]

[.794, 1.056]

[CI]
Observations = 19134
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Table 3.6 Difference-in-differences of NJ department-quarter panel dataset
𝑠𝑒 (𝛽)

p

[CI]

.426***

.118

0

[.347, .523]

1.000

.000

.285

[.999, 1.000]

1.049***

.015

.001

[1.029, 1.071]

1.006

.021

.788

[.978, 1.034]

.991

.021

.669

[.962, 1.021]

𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽)
Training
Violent crime rate
% of population Black
% of population foreign-born
% of population on SNAP benefits
Observations = 700
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Table 3.7 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is violent crime rate)
Municipality
Newark
Jersey City

Weight Municipality
0 Gloucester Township

Weight
1.43

.006 East Orange

0

Paterson

0 Bayonne

0

Elizabeth

0 Franklin

2.69

Edison

0 North Bergen

Woodbridge
Lakewood

.727 Vineland
0 Union Township

0
0
1.20

Tom’s River

.390 Piscataway

0

Hamilton

2.49 New Brunswick

0

Trenton

0 Jackson

Clifton

0 Wayne

0

Brick

0 Irvington

0

Cherry Hill

2.75 Howell

1.98

0

Passaic

0 Perth Amboy

.718

Middletown

0 Hoboken

0

Union City

0 Plainfield

0

Old Bridge

0 West New York

0
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Table 3.8 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (treatment occurs one quarter
earlier)
Municipality

Weight Municipality

Weight

Newark

0 Gloucester Township

0

Jersey City

0 East Orange

0

Paterson

0 Bayonne

0

.147 Franklin

3.06

Elizabeth
Edison

0 North Bergen

0

Woodbridge

0 Vineland

0

Lakewood

0 Union Township

.166

Tom’s River

0 Piscataway

1.57

Hamilton

0 New Brunswick

0

Trenton

0 Jackson

0

Clifton

0 Wayne

Brick

.090

.685 Irvington

0

Cherry Hill

0 Howell

0

Passaic

0 Perth Amboy

0

Middletown

4.60 Hoboken

1.44

Union City

1.04 Plainfield

0

Old Bridge

3.43 West New York

0
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Table 3.9 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is all use of force
incidents)
Municipality

Weight Municipality

Weight

Newark

0 Gloucester Township

Jersey City

0 East Orange

.678

Paterson

0 Bayonne

.213

.054 Franklin

.136

Elizabeth

0

Edison

0 North Bergen

0

Woodbridge

0 Vineland

0

Lakewood

0 Union Township

Tom’s River

0 Piscataway

Hamilton

.076 New Brunswick

Trenton

0 Jackson

Clifton

0 Wayne

Brick

0 Irvington

Cherry Hill

.055 Howell

.274
0
0
0
.634
0
0

Passaic

0 Perth Amboy

0

Middletown

0 Hoboken

0

.664 Plainfield

0

Union City
Old Bridge

0 West New York

0

120

Table 3.10 Municipality weights in the synthetic Camden (outcome is more serious use of
force incidents)
Municipality

Weight Municipality

Weight

Newark

0 Gloucester Township

Jersey City

0 East Orange

.678

Paterson

0 Bayonne

.213

.696 Franklin

.136

Elizabeth

0

Edison

0 North Bergen

0

Woodbridge

0 Vineland

0

Lakewood

0 Union Township

Tom’s River

0 Piscataway

.274
0

Hamilton

.216 New Brunswick

0

Trenton

.087 Jackson

0

Clifton

0 Wayne

Brick

0 Irvington

0

Cherry Hill

0 Howell

0

Passaic

0 Perth Amboy

0

Middletown

0 Hoboken

0

.843 Plainfield

0

Union City
Old Bridge

0 West New York

.634

0
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Table 3.11 Dates of training
Training type
De-escalation
PERF-ICAT

Training date
2015-05-02
2015-09-09
2015-11-20
2015-12-16
2016-09-13
2016-09-21
2016-09-28
2016-10-06
2016-10-07
2016-10-12
2016-10-16
2016-11-09
2016-11-23
2017-01-27
2017-03-23
2017-06-15
2017-07-13
2017-12-21

Officers trained
15
16
18
22
2
47
47
41
20
27
18
44
55
22
12
1
33
63
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Figure 3.1 De-escalation training rollout in Camden County, New Jersey
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Figure 3.2 Use of force before and after training
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Figure 3.3 Event study for PERF-ICAT training
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Figure 3.4 Use of force incidents per 1,000 arrests
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Figure 3.5 Trends in serious use of force: Camden vs. five largest New Jersey cities
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Figure 3.6 Trends in Camden use of force: breakdown by force level
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Figure 3.7 Trends in serious UOF incidents: Camden vs. synthetic Camden
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Figure 3.8 Serious UOF rate gap between Camden and synthetic Camden
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Figure 3.9 Trends in violent crime rate: Camden vs. synthetic Camden
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Figure 3.10 Subsuming anticipation effects: treatment occurs one quarter earlier
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Figure 3.11 Using all force incidents as outcomes
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Figure 3.12: Using incidents involving firearm and non-firearm weapons as outcome
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Figure 3.13 Gap in rate of serious force in Camden and placebo gaps in all 34 control
municipalities
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Figure 3.14 Gap in rate of serious force in Camden and placebo gaps in all 29 control
municipalities excluding tests with a pre-intervention RMSPE of over 20
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
This dissertation set out to evaluate policy solutions to police use of force. Findings
suggest that a) federal intervention in municipal law enforcement agencies reduces police
killings by some 30%, b) where body-worn cameras’ effect on officer-involved shootings
are concerned, their presence matters less than policy oversight to ensure their activation,
and c) de-escalation training works to decrease police use of force, and peer or spillover
effects may obscure the very real effects that they have on individual officers’ behavior.
The first paper in this dissertation demonstrated that federal intervention, specifically in
the form of DOJ investigation and court-appointed monitorship to oversee consent decree
settlements, reduce police killings by nearly 30% each. However, consent decree
settlements in the absence of court-appointed monitors did not significantly affect such
fatalities. Moreover, the issuance of technical assistance letters – non-legally binding
policy documents typically outlining DOJ recommendations to law enforcement agencies
– had a positive and significant effect on such fatalities. The second paper found that while
the presence of body-worn cameras did not have a significant impact on the incidence of
officer-involved shootings, a departmental policy that restricted officer discretion on when
cameras should be activated had a negative and significant impact on officer-involved
shootings, reducing them by over 30%. Secondary research questions investigated bodyworn cameras’ effects on index crime arrests, low-level arrests, and the violent and
property crime rates. The results found that while body-worn camera coverage and policies
had null effects on the crime rates, body-worn camera policies that restricted officer
discretion on when cameras should be activated and that expressly prohibited footage
tampering and unauthorized access reduced low-level arrests, suggesting that a mediating
mechanism for the finding that body-worn camera policies reduce officer-involved
shooting is de-policing – officers retreating from pro-active policing and making fewer
arrests for low-level offenses, thus reducing the likelihood that officers and civilians would
encounter each other in the first place. The third and last paper in the dissertation evaluated
the implementation of de-escalation training in Camden County, New Jersey. Two
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supplementary analyses were employed. In the first, a difference-in-differences analyses
of individual officers found no significant changes in serious use of force. However, it was
hypothesized that ‘spillover’ or ‘peer’ effects – in which officers who were trained exerted
behavioral influences on officers who had not been trained, leading to fewer observed
differences between treatment and control groups – could account for the null effect.
Therefore, using a synthetic control methodology, the second analysis compared levels of
serious force of Camden County Police Department with other large law enforcement
agencies in New Jersey and found that de-escalation training led to a 40% reduction in
serious force events. In addition to providing evidence that de-escalation training can
reduce serious force, this finding suggests that researchers conducting randomized
controlled trials in police contexts should carefully account for the phenomenon of
‘contagious accountability’ (Ariel et al. 2017).
In the post-Ferguson era of policing, criminologists have increasingly sought to verify
the effect of proposed policy solutions to police use of force. Lum et al. (2019) and Engel
et al. (2020) provide valuable reviews of the evidence on body-worn cameras and deescalation training respectively. Taken together, this dissertation seeks to add to that base
of evidence, and Papers 2 and 3 do evaluate solutions that have been the topic of extended
discussion by academics and policymakers. While body-worn cameras have been
extensively evaluated in randomized controlled trials, less attention has been paid to
variation in departmental body-worn camera policies. The findings from Paper 2 lend
weight to arguments that policy oversight over novel technologies matter more than the
technology itself. Ahead of the randomized controlled trials of de-escalation training which
are still largely forthcoming, the findings from Paper 3 provide evidence that de-escalation
training can reduce serious use of force – and cautionary implications that randomized
controlled trials that do not account for spillover effects between individual officers may
not pick up on effects that are nonetheless substantial. With regards to the topic of Paper 1
– federal intervention in municipal police departments –few studies have examined the
impact of consent decrees and other forms of federal intervention on measures of police
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accountability and police violence, even though they arguably represent one of the most
sweeping and comprehensive instruments of police accountability. The results suggest that
federal intervention is a valuable tool in the quest to reduce the number of lives lost to
police use of force.
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